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Captive Markets
LEAH

A.

PLUNKETr*

Modern county jails have increasingly adopted policies to bill their inmates for some or
all of the costs of their room and board. Statutes authorizing counties to implement
these "pay-to-stay"programs are on the books in roughly seventy percent of states, yet
the financialmechanism on which these programs typically rely is not well understood.
Although the pay-to-stay obligation bears some resemblance to familiar citizen-state
financial transactions-such as fines and penalties, restitution, taxes, and fees-it
usually belongs to a distinct model that this Article calls the "government-imposed
loan." This Article provides an overview of the landscape of pay-to-stay programs and
an articulation of the imposed loan model. The Article also assesses the normative
desirabilityof the imposed loan model, focusing primarily on pay-to-stay programs.
The imposed loan structure raises concerns in two primary areas: citizen privacy and
governmental services. This model requires citizen-borrowers to disclose personal
financial information-some of it with a dubious substantive link to the underlying
issue for which a given service was provided-to the government on a long-term basis.
It also creates some disincentive for these borrowers to work, thus increasing the
likelihood that they will consume governmental services in addition to the one for
which the loan was imposed. On balance, it does not appear that the familiarstructure
of a consumer loan translates well for use in captive markets, such as jail housing or
emergency services, where citizens essentially have no choice but to consume services
provided by the government through its police powers.
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INTRODUCTION

In states nationwide, many counties are charging jail inmates for
their time in jail.' Through "pay-to-stay" programs, inmates are held

i. See infra Part I.B. See generally Gary F. Cornelius, Jails, Pre-TrialDetention, and Short Term
Confinement, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 389, 389-90 (Kevin R. Reitz &
Joan Petersilia eds., 2012) ("Every jurisdiction in the United States-whether a city, county, or towneither operates a jail or has combined resources with other jurisdictions to have access to a jail....
Jails are not prisons. A prison is defined as a correctional facility, administered by the federal
government or a state government, that confines adult offenders who are sentenced to terms of
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financially responsible for some or all of the basic cost of their own
incarceration, usually characterized as a "room and board," or other
similar charges.' Pay-to-stay has been likened to a hotel.3 Although this
metaphor is apt in some respects, overall it fails to capture the unique
hardships of life behind bars.' Just as guests in a hotel must pay all the
costs not only for their hotel room, but also for their travel to and from
the hotel and to participate in activities during their stay, inmates are
increasingly saddled with many, even most, of the costs related to the
process of convicting, detaining, and releasing them.' In addition to basic
room and board, inmates may be charged "a la carte" for costs related to
their prosecution,6 judicial proceedings,7 criminal defense,' bail,9
booking,"0 parole or probation supervision," electronic monitoring,
substance abuse treatment, 3 medical care,'4 and various other services."

confinement for more than one year.... Jails are defined as locally funded and operated correctional
facilities that are centrally located in a community."). This Article is about pay-to-stay programs in
county jails, although similar programs in city jails or state prisons are occasionally mentioned. Some
sources use the terms "jail," "prison," and similar labels in a general sense to refer to places where
people are incarcerated pursuant to government authority, and many observations about one type of
facility apply to others. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STuNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE I
(2011) ("[Flor black males, a term in the nearest penitentiary has become an ordinary life
experience.").
2. See infra note 176 and accompanying text; see also BARBARA KzAUTH & KARIN STAYTON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., FEES PAID BY JAIL INMATES: FEE CATEGORIES, REVENUES, AND

MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES INA SAMPLE OF U.S. JAILS 15 (Connie Clem ed., 2005) (defining "'[p]ay-tostay' or 'per diem' fees [as being) for daily subsistence"). I use "inmates" to refer to those jail residents
who have been determined to be guilty of a crime. Pre-trial detainees may also be charged under payto-stay, but the focus of this piece is on the obligations of current and former inmates.
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, In California,A Plan to ChargeInmatesfor Their Stay, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2011, at A15 ("A one night stay at this city's [Riverside, California] finest hotel costs $19o....
Soon, a twin metal bunk at the county jail, with meals served on plastic trays, will run $142.42."); cf.
Caitlin Dewey, On Yelp, the View from Jail, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2013, at AI (documenting inmates'
reviews of jails and prisons on popular review website Yelp.com).
4. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 16o U. PA. L. REv. 779, 8og (2012) ("[A] bad
prison experience is worse than a bad hotel stay.").
5. See, e.g., ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DET: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 7 (2010) ("Across the country, individuals face an increasing number of 'user
fees' as part of their criminal cases.").
6. See, e.g., id. at 8 (listing "[pirosecution reimbursement fees" as potential debt imposed at
sentencing stage of criminal case).
7. See, e.g., FAHY G. MULLANEY, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS INCOMMUNITY CORRECTnONS 7 (i988) (listing "court costs" as potential economic sanction).
8. See generally Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for
Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution,42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323
(2009); Kate Levine, Note, If You Cannot Afford A Lawyer: Assessing the Constitutionality of
Massachusetts'sReimbursement Statute, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 191 (2007).
9. See, e.g., MULLANEY, supra note 7, at 7 (including "bail investigation fee" as potential
economic sanction).
3o. See, e.g., AM. CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S NEw DEBTORS'
PRISONS 30 (2010) [hereinafter ACLU] (listing "jail entry fee" as among potential costs imposed on
incarcerated defendants in Michigan).
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However, such costs typically complement, rather than replace,
more familiar financial sanctions such as fines, penalties, and restitution
to victims of crime. 6 Inmates may find themselves with significant
financial liability even for minor infractions. For example, in 201o, a
young single mother of two sons was jailed in Michigan for failing to pay
fines for traffic violations that she could not afford and was then billed
for her room and board in the jail while she served time for the nonpayment. 7 Such results are common in what the pending revision of the
Model Penal Code describes as "a part of the corrections world that has
developed in a patchwork, irrational fashion. It has produced a milieu of
8
absurd complexity and disparity of application to individual offenders."'
The core concept behind pay-to-stay- that inmates should bear
financial responsibility for their own room and board-is not limited to
basic jail accommodations. Having money or the means to earn it may
make the inmates' circumstances while serving their sentence better. In
many jurisdictions, inmates authorized to participate in a work-release
program-in which they have the liberty to leave jail to go to their
regular jobs during the day and return at night or on the weekendsmust pay some amount of their earnings to the jail.'9 Recently,

ii. See, e.g., MULLANEY, supra note 7, at 8 (listing "parole supervision" and "probation
supervision" as potential economic sanctions).
12. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEES PAID BY JAIL INMATES: FINDINGS
FROM THE NATION'S LARGEST JAILS 2 (I997) (describing "electronic monitoring" as fee-based program).
13. See, e.g., id. at 2 (describing such treatment as "rehabilitation program" for which fee may be
charged).
14. See, e.g., KRAuTH & STAYTON, supra note 2, at 15 (describing co-payments or other fees for

medical services as one of "four major areas" of fees).
15. See, e.g., id. at 12-I4 (listing other charges, such as GED testing). It is not unheard of for jails

to charge for personal items. See, e.g., Heather Rutz, Residents Question Putnam Sales Tax Hike
Proposals,LIMA NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008 (charging inmates for underwear).
16. Cf. Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction, so CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 509, 519 (2011) (explaining that "fees and fines in the United States are imposed largely at

judges' discretion; they also supplement rather than replace other criminal sanctions").
17. ACLU, supra note io, at 29-30 ("'I just need a chance to do right,' said [the mother]. 'It
doesn't make sense to jail people when they can't pay because they definitely can't pay while they're
in jail."'). See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 9 (showing county court docket sheet for "a
Pennsylvania woman convicted of a drug crime [who] incurred 26 different fees, ranging from $2 to
$345. When her financial obligations are added together, she faces $2,464 in fees alone, an amount that

is approximately three times larger than both her fine ($5oo) and restitution ($325) combined").
I8. MODEL PENAL CODE: SErTENCING § 6.04 cmt. k. (Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2012) (on file with

Author). The course of development in the area of financial charges imposed on defendants to cover
the government's criminal justice costs has been a source of concern since the practice first gained
traction. Roughly twenty-five years ago, the director of the National Institute of Corrections-an
agency of the Federal Department of Justice-wrote: "Economic sanctions have proliferated more

dramatically than any other form of criminal sanctions during this decade [the 198os].... The bulk of
this growth in economic sanctions appears to be unplanned, resulting from a wide variety of
motivations." MULLANEY, supra note 7, at v.

i9. See Joshua Mitchom, Note, Making Prisoners Pay for Their Stay: How A Popular
CorrectionalProgram Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 13 B.U. PUB. Ir. L.J. r87, 188 (2004) ("Pay-
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jurisdictions in California have gone a step further. In "pay-to-upgrade"
programs," certain offenders pay a fee up front or contemporaneously
with their sentence to serve time in a more desirable facility (or part of a
facility) instead of county jail; the key difference from pay-to-stay is that
those inmates who cannot afford to pay for the upgrade are almost
always denied admission.2'
In pay-to-stay programs, no inmate is denied food or shelter due to
inability or unwillingness to pay.2 For jails to do otherwise would run
afoul of the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 3
Courts that have considered constitutional challenges to pay-to-stay
programs have found it crucial that inmates are guaranteed basic
necessities regardless of whether they can pay. 4 Because inmates are
allowed to stay in jail without ever paying, the financial transaction
between the government and inmates does not fall neatly into familiar
models of financial interactions between the government and its citizens.
The typical pay-to-stay program actually functions as a loan imposed on
the inmate by the government.
This Article identifies this type of transaction as the "governmentimposed loan": the government pays the up-front cost of incarceration,
which the inmate must re-pay according to some schedule with certain
terms.2" Other costs may be added over time, such as those of interest and
late fees.26 Collection methods may include the use of private debtcollection agencies,27 the inclusion of the repayment obligation as a

to-stay flowed logically from laws requiring prisoners to pay copayments for medical care. That
practice was adopted by states beginning in the I97os and 8os and is now common. A related practice
common in the majority of states is for correctional authorities to make deductions from money
earned by inmates who are allowed to leave the penal facility on work release.").
20. Some scholars have used "pay-to-stay" to describe this arrangement. See Robert Weisberg,
Pay-to-Stay in CaliforniaJails and the Value of Systemic Embarrassment, io6 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 55, 55 (2007) available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/pay-to-stay-incaliformia-jails-and-the-value-of-systemic-self-embarassment. For the sake of clarity, this Article use
"pay-to-stay" to mean inmate payment for the basic county jail to which he is assigned, and "pay-toupgrade" to mean that the inmate can pay a higher amount-up-front and in full-to stay in a nicer
facility. At least one other scholar has included "upgrade" to qualify the "pay-to-stay" label to reflect
the latter scenario. See generally Kim Shayo Buchanan, It Could Happen to "You": Pay-to-Stay Jail
Upgrades,
io6
MIcH.
L.
REv.
FIRST
IMPRESSIONS
60
(2007),
available at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/it-could-happen-to-you-pay-to-stay-jai-upgrades.
21. See Buchanan, supra note 20, at 61.
22. See infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text
23. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
24. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 416 ( 3 d Cir. 20oo) (observing
that a jail inmate subject to pay-to-stay program "was never denied any basic human need").
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part I.B.2.e.
27. See infra Part I.B.2.c.
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condition of probation or parole," and the reincarceration of released
inmates for willful non-payment. 9
Not all jurisdictions with pay-to-stay programs use the imposed loan
model." Even among those that do, there is tremendous variation among
jurisdictions regarding the specifics of how this lending transaction
occurs. For example, some jurisdictions permit repayment to be debited
directly from an inmate's commissary account3'-the personal funds
available to an inmate32 - while others require a court order and allow
collection only through the standard means available to non-governmental
creditors.33
Courts have struggled with how to label the pay-to-stay
transaction,34 and scholars have recognized -largely implicitly-that payto-stay defies easy categorization. To the extent that the topic has been

considered in legal scholarship, it often has been part of a broader
category that encompasses all or many types of financial obligations that
are imposed on criminal defendants, rather than as a manifestation of a
specific, familiar financial transaction between the government and its
citizens.3" The legal scholarly literature on pay-to-stay and related topics

28. See infra Part I.B.2.e.
29. See infra Part I.B.2.e. Although the Constitution prohibits incarceration of criminal
defendants based on their inability to pay an economic sanction, practitioner reports suggest that this
practice is not uncommon. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note io, at 5-8.
30. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-x29(a)(I)(A) (2012) (authorizing "the governing body in
which a district court is located" to levy and collect additional fines to "help defray the cost of
incarcerating ... prisoners"); UTAH CODE § 76-3-20o(6)(a) (2013) ("In addition to any other sentence
... the defendant shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of medical
care provided to the defendant while in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing.").
31. See infra Part I.B,2.b.
32. See, e.g., OSCEOLA CNTY. FLA. CORR. DEPT., Jail Commissary Account Fund Opportunities,
http://www.osceola.org/correctionsdep/1 6i-2537-o/jaiLcommissary-account-fund-opportunities.cfm (last
visited on Oct. 31, 2013) (informing relatives and friends how to deposit money into inmate accounts).
33. See infra Part I.B,2.a.
34. See Mitchom, supra note i9, at 188. But see Fox Butterfield, Many Local Officials Now Make
Inmates Pay Their Own Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at Ai ("In a few cases, courts have sided with
the inmates on specific [constitutional] issues."). Cf Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d
410, 416 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Courts have consistently found that there is no constitutional impediment to
deducting the cost of room and board from a prisoner's wages.").
35. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization
of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REv. 349, 353 (2012) (defining category of "'carceral debt'.., to describe
civil debt associated with criminal justice penalties or debt incurred during incarceration, or both");
Bridget McCormack, Economic Incarceration, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 223, 223 (2007)

(referring broadly to "economic sanctions" imposed on misdemeanants); R. Barry Ruback & Valerie
Clark, Economic Sanctions in Pennsylvania: Complex and Inconsistent, 49 DUQ. L. REv. 751, 755
(20 1) (describing category of "[c]osts and fees [which] refer to court-imposed orders to reimburse the
jurisdiction ... for the administrative cost of operating the criminal justice system"). Several pieces of
student scholarship have focused on pay-to-stay programs. See, e.g., Alison Bo Andolena, Note, Can
They Lock You Up and Charge You for It?: How Pay-to-Stay Corrections ProgramsMay Provide A
FinancialSolution for New York and New Jersey, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 94 (2010); Mitchom, supra
note 59. Legal practitioners and advocates have made a substantial contribution to describing and
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is still in its infancy, 36 however, so the financial modeling issue and many
others have not yet been widely developed. Such analysis is timely, given
the recent high-profile debate over when government may lawfully
require citizens to enter into a marketplace, 37 as well as the on-going
challenge of funding a costly criminal justice system." The governmentimposed loan model does not appear to have any inherent constitutional
defects. Indeed, several Supreme Court Justices recently observed that
state governments enjoy considerable latitude in imposing "purchase
mandates" on citizens, as long as the good or service purchased does not
itself pose constitutional problems. 9 A loan is a means of purchasing a
good or service and, given the current resource constraints facing local
and state governments, such loans are likely to be an increasingly
appealing method for governments to impose on their citizenry.4"
This Article has two goals, the first descriptive and the second
normative: (I) to highlight the underexplored "captive market" that
exists in pay-to-stay jail housing through government-imposed loans, and
(2) to assess whether the government-imposed loan model should be
used where similar stealth lending markets exist for services provided by

analyzing pay-to-stay programs and the financial costs imposed on criminal defendants more broadly.
See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supranote 5, at 4 (referring to "charg[ing] defendants for everything from
probation supervision, to jail stays, to the use of a constitutionally-required public defender" as "'user
fees,"' a part of "criminal justice debt" more broadly); ACLU, supra note 1o, at 5 (defining "legal
financial obligations (LFOs)" as "a general term that includes all fines, fees, and costs associated with
a criminal sentence"). In addition, sociologists have made important contributions to our
understanding of pay-to-stay programs and the broader phenomenon of imposing costs on criminal
defendants. See, e.g., Beckett & Harris, supra note 16, at 5o9-Io ("Fees are intended mainly to recoup
criminal justice costs and may not be statutorily defined as penalties. By contrast, fines are intended as
criminal penalties. Nonetheless, we treat both fees and fines as monetary sanctions," which are also
referred to as "LFOs [legal financial obligations].") This Article draws on some sociological studies,
while remaining grounded in legal academic discourse.
36. See MODEL PENAL CoDE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 2013) (on file
with Author) ("It is an understatement to observe that research and policy debate have not kept stride
with these major trends in sentencing law and policy [including governmental reliance upon pay-tostay and similar programs], and the changes in their social and economic context, over the past several
decades.").
37. See, e.g., JEFFREY ToOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUsE AND THE SUPREME COURT 27577 (2oi2) (excerpting oral argument before the Supreme Court in the Affordable Care Act litigation
involving the "broccoli question": when can the government make citizens purchase a product?).
38. See Allegra M. McLeod, DecarcerationCourts: Possibilitiesand Perils of a Shifting Criminal
Law, IO GEo. L.J. 1587, 1587 (2012) (identifying the "exorbitant associated costs" of incarceration as
one of the "causes for alarm" in the "widely decried crisis confront[ing] U.S. criminal law").
39. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2624 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing states' "unquestioned authority to impose
[purchase] mandates" on citizens).
40. See, e.g., Micah West, Comment, FinancialConflicts of Interestand the Funding of New Orleans's
Criminal Courts, Ioi CALIF. L. REv. 521, 524 (2013) ("In New Orleans, nearly every criminal justice
agency depends at least partially on financial assessments [fines, fees, costs, etc.] to fund its operations.");
see also Lisa Lambert, Outlook Still Grim for US State, Local Budgets--GAO, REUTERs, Apr. 5, 2012,
availableat http://www.reuters.com/article/2ol2/o4/o5/usa-states-gao-idUSL2E8F55LF2oI2o4o5.
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local or state governments pursuant to their core police powers." The
argument that markets exist generally within criminal law and procedure
is well established.4" The assertion that they exist within jails has also been
explored,43 albeit in a much more limited fashion. This Article contributes
to the discussion by focusing on a specific jail housing market-pay-tostay-that is built upon a specific financial transaction: the governmentimposed loan. It also provides a more broadly applicable analysis of the
largely unacknowledged type of lending transaction between the
government and its citizens that the jail housing market presents.'
Part I offers a general overview of the landscape of pay-to-stay
programs nationwide, providing a description of their recent history, and
analyzing trends in their use. Part II considers the familiar financial models
of punishment and government revenue-generation into which pay-to-stay
could fall-fines and penalties, criminal restitution, taxes, and fees-then
argues that it is properly understood as a manifestation of a distinct model:
the government-imposed loan.45 Borrowing is mandatory. However, even
if inmates do not pay their debt, they still receive the services (room and
board) covered by the loan. 6 The imposed loan mechanism thus offers the
government a way of requiring all inmates to pay their own room and
board, and of not running afoul of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
denying basic shelter and sustenance to those in state custody.47
41. See infra Part III.A.
42. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment,and the Market for Offenses, io J. ECON. PERSP. 43
(I996); Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and
JurisdictionalCompetition, 103 MIcH. L. REV. 1831 (20o5). Criminal law has also been analyzed in
relation to private market transactions. See, e.g., Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal
Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985).
43. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 20, at 55 (referring to "forms of currency exchanged in the
market for punishment" in context of pay-to-upgrade programs). Weisberg also argues that courts
have "recognized the role of market-style transactions in criminal justice." Id. at 56. The most recent
draft of the revised Model Penal Code refers broadly to "marketplaces" of economic sanctions,
terminology that was adopted after reporters saw a draft of this Article. See MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 2013) (on file with Author).
44. Others have observed that criminal defendants may become debtors as the result of pay-tostay or similar obligations, but their analysis has depicted the underlying credit arrangement in broad
terms rather than identifying the specific type of transaction involved in pay-to-stay as a loan imposed
by the government. See infra notes 259-26o and accompanying text. And at least one law review article
has noted a type of loan at work in a context similar to pay-to-stay-public defender reimbursementand remarked on its implications for representing indigent defendants, although the focus was not on
developing the loan model. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 371 ("But, as the right to counsel at public
expense evolves into a loan rather than a gift, withholding the right to counsel of choice appears more
and more untenable."). This Article's identification and exploration of the government-imposed loan
model thus engages a nascent dialogue within existing literature.
45. See infra Part II.A.
46. See infra Part II.A.4.
47. See infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text Alexander Volokh proposed a "thought
experiment" in which "instead of assigning a prisoner to a particular prison bureaucratically, we gave
the prisoner a voucher, good for one incarceration, to be redeemed at a participating prison." Volokh,
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Part III argues that the imposed loan model currently exists in
limited contexts beyond pay-to-stay programs and could be used more
broadly." With proper attention to any applicable constitutional and
legal restrictions, the government could transform the provision of
services it is obligated to provide through its core police powers into an
occasion for loan origination to service recipients. Such a transformation
of citizens into mandatory borrowers raises ethical issues, which will be
the subject of future work.49 This Part offers a normative analysis of the
structure of imposed loans, ° identifying structural concerns related to two
primary areas: citizen privacy and effective provision of governmental
services. The imposed loan model aims to promote individual
responsibility but it appears more likely to increase governmental
involvement in citizens' lives, and governmental expenditures. In general,
the translation of the basic consumer loan for use in captive markets does
not appear to be smooth, and this Article raises some potential ways in
which the imposed loan mechanism itself is likely to be transformed
going forward.
I.

A.

LEGAL LANDSCAPE

PAY-TO-STAY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This Part aims to situate pay-to-stay programs in a very general
historical context; it does not endeavor to provide a historiographical
account of today's programs, their predecessors, or the origins of this
type of practice." The underlying principle of pay-to-stay is not at all
new, but the programs currently in effect are of recent vintage.
First, the concept that jail inmates could be made to pay some type
of room and board or confinement cost has deep roots in the Anglo-

supra note 4, at 781. The proposal is not as radical as it appears. Pay-to-stay programs already put
inmates in the position of purchasing, to some extent, their own time behind bars, albeit without the
element of choice that is central to Volokh's plan.
48. See infra Part III.A.
49. See infra note 274.
50. Other financial structures within the criminal justice system-such as forfeiture of drugrelated assets-have been shown to have significant effects on the system; in the case of forfeiture, for
instance, these include "distort[ing] governmental policymaking and law enforcement" and
"producing self-financing, unaccountable law enforcement agencies divorced from any meaningful
legislative oversight." Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1998); see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. t, 4 (1997) (identifying "funding
decisions" as one of the three forces that dominate the "criminal justice system").
51. Some historical studies describe the issue of payment for an inmate's incarceration at
different historical junctures. See, e.g., O.F. LEwis, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND
PRISON CUSTOMS 1776-1845 at 275-78 (1922) (describing requirement that creditors pay maintenance
costs of debtors incarcerated in county jails due to debtors' non-payment of debts).
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American legal tradition. 2 In the United States, versions of this general
requirement have been imposed on inmates since the Colonial Era. 3 A
particularly insidious application existed in the Jim Crow South. In what
was essentially a de facto return to slavery, mass numbers of African
American men were arrested for non-violent offenses, and then leased to
companies that had paid their criminal justice costs, such as room and
board, to work off the debt.54 Although its roots run deep, the counties'
ability to impose a room and board or similar cost requirements on
inmates does not appear to be grounded in common law.5 Typically,
statutory authorization has been necessary for the county to impose this
obligation.: How explicit this authorization must be today is not entirely
clear.57
Second, the current wave of pay-to-stay programs in county jails has
been a feature of the national legal landscape for roughly twenty-five
years.8 Related measures, such as charging inmates for medical co-pays
and requiring inmates on work-release to contribute to their room and

52. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 69 Ala. 318, 319 (1881) (discussing how the then-current statute
made meal costs while in jail part of costs of criminal case that defendant could be ordered to work
off). Cf Note, State Reimbursement for Prisoners' Maintenance, 45 YALE LJ. 1301, 1302 n.3 (I936)
(explaining that "[a] few states [in United States] a century ago [183os] tried a system of individual
accounting with each prisoner, charging him with maintenance costs and crediting his account with the
proceeds of his labor, any adverse balance remaining a charge upon his property after his release").
53. See, e.g., Souza v. Sheriff of Bristol Cnty., 918 N.E.2d 823, 829 n.9 (Mass. 201o) (concluding
that, throughout Massachusetts history, "[t]here is no dispute that, by statutory authorization,sheriffs,
at various time, were authorized to charge certain fees"); see also MASS. PROVINCE LAWS 1692-1693,
c. 37, § I (authorizing fees "[fQor diet").
54. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, to-ii (2011); see also
Alexes Harris et al.,
Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary
United States, 115 AM. J. Soc. 1753, 1758 (2010) (explaining the "imposition of monetary sanctions was the
foundation of the convict lease system in the southern United States through the 1940s").
55. See, e.g., Souza, 918 N.E.2d at 828-29 ("While the sheriff provides support for the proposition
that his authority to manage and control county jails derived from common law, he does not cite to
any authority providing that, under common law, sheriffs were permitted to charge fees, which we
conclude is a distinct function not subsumed in his custodial duties.").
56. See, e.g.,
State v.Fleming, No.104,944, 2011 WL 6413629, at *Ii (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011)
(striking down county pay-to-stay ordinance for failing to comply with requirements of enabling state
statute).
57. A leading case in the area of pay-to-stay programs, Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility,
221 F.3d 410, 423 (3d Cir. 2000), found no infirmity with such a program implemented in the absence
of an authorizing state statute on point. However, given the prevalence of statutes explicitly
authorizing pay-to-stay programs, it is likely that most counties and the institutions within them are
proceeding-or attempting to-pursuant to specific statutory parameters. See infra Part I.B.s.
58. There does not appear to be a definitive account of where and when the first of these
contemporary programs was implemented, although conventional wisdom seems to be that itwas in
Macomb County, Michigan in 1985. See, e.g., Sheila McLaughlin, Pay-to-Stay Mantra Nixed for Jails,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 14, 2oio, available at http://news.cincinnati.com/article/AB/2oIO0213/
NEWSoi/2I 40 34 5 (quoting Macomb County Sheriff as saying that his "program was the first in the nation
and he still gets calls from out-of-state sheriffs who want to know how he does it").
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board, have been in place longer." Outside of limited contexts such as
work release, however, up until the early 197Os, fees charged to offenders
were rare.60 But beginning in the 197OS and then accelerating during the
i98os, these practices changed dramatically. 6' Room and board fees
proliferated, beginning in roughly the second half of the I98os, picking
up steam in the 199os, and continuing in the twenty-first century. 6, This
growth has been part of a broader shift in criminal justice toward placing
many costs of the system on defendants through fees and other required
payments. 63 In addition, during roughly the same time period, the role of
other economic sanctions in criminal sentencing, such as the more
familiar fine, has expanded. 64 Today, monetary sanctions, also referred to
as legal financial obligations ("LFOs"), "include the fees, fines,
restitution orders, and other financial obligations that may be imposed
by the courts and other criminal justice agencies on persons accused of
crimes" and are the norm rather than the exception because research
indicates that they are "imposed on a substantial majority of the millions
of people convicted of crimes in the United States annually. '' 6' The recent
expansion and current ubiquity of these sanctions typically have been
less remarked upon than another contemporaneous development: the
"imprisonment boom, dating back to the mid-197os, that is without
parallel in any other industrialized country. ' ' 6
Taken together and considered on the broadest level, these three
trends -pay-to-stay, monetary sanctions, and imprisonment -suggest
that criminal defendants in the twenty-first century are more likely to pay
for their incarceration (and for other matters related their criminal case)
59. See Mitchom, supra note I9, at 188 (explaining that "[p]ay-to-stay flowed logically from laws
requiring prisoners to pay copayments for medical care. That practice was adopted by states beginning
in the 197oS and 8os and is now common. A related practice common in the majority of states is for
correctional authorities to make deductions from money earned by inmates who are allowed to leave
the penal facility on work release").
60. Fahy G. Mullaney, The Fee Fad: Punishment Without Public Policy, PERSP. 6, 6 (Fall 1988)
[hereinafter Mullaney, The Fee Fad]. It had long been common to use some form of labor by
inmates -performed within or under the control of the carceral facility-to help "defray some of the
costs of their confinement." See MULLANEY, supra note 7, at i.
61. Mullaney, The Fee Fad, supra note 60, at 6.
62. See, e.g., Philip P. Pan, Pr. George's Considers Fee for Jail Food; Correction Chiefs Plan
Troubles Local ACLU, WASH. POST, June 1, 1988, at Boi ("The idea of charging inmates for services is
one that has swept the nation since the late i98os, beginning with small fees for doctor visits and
evolving more recently to full-blown plans that bill inmates for the cost of room and board."); Sara B.
Miller, Is It Fairand Legal For Inmates to Foot Their Room and Board?,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July
21, 2004, at 2 ("'Pay to stay' fees have soared in popularity across the nation in the past 15 years.").
63. See generally supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text.
64. See Harris et al., supra note 54, at 1758-59 ("[I]n recent years, a number of observers have
noted that the range of monetary sanctions potentially imposed in criminal cases has continued to
proliferate" since the early i97os).
65. Id. at 1756, 1753.
66. James Q. Whitman, The Free Market and the Prison, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (2012)
(book review).
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than defendants were before the 197Os. 67 The specific trends of pay-tostay are discussed in more detail below; the point here is that these
programs should be understood as part of a fairly recent shift within the
criminal justice system toward requiring defendants to pay more money
for more reasons.
B.

PAY-TO-STAY TODAY: TRENDS AND THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE

i. Trends in Pay-to-Stay

The impetus for county pay-to-stay programs has generally flowed
from one or more of the following three considerations,6 depending on
the particular implementing body or official: (I) budget constraints,
(2) political pressures, and (3) criminal justice objectives. 69 The first
consideration, budget constraints, comes into play when the intersection
of mounting incarceration costs with shrinking government coffers (more
strapped at some points than others)7' has left county officials searching
for new sources of revenue in the area of corrections and criminal justice

67. As has been extensively explored in the literature on mass incarceration, jail and prison
inmates today tend to be poor-with men of color disproportionately represented among their
ranks-who have limited to no access to money, employment, or education. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra
note i, at i (stating that today "for black males, a term in the nearest penitentiary has become an
ordinary life experience, a horrifying truth that wasn't true a mere generation ago"); Harris et al.,
supra note 54, at 176o ("Poor people, people of color, and men are more likely to be involved in the
criminal justice system."); McCormack, supra note 35, at 228 ("All of the available data suggests that
people in the criminal justice system have limited education, and limited employment histories and
opportunities. Approximately 75% of defendants charged with misdemeanors are indigent."); Kirsten
D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors' Prison-Prisoners'Accumulation of Debt as A Barrierto
Reentry, 41 CLEA JNGHOUSE REV. 187, 187-88 (2OO7) ("Our nation's prison population is
overwhelmingly poor-a critical factual backdrop to any discussion of debt accumulation during a
prison stay.... Prison inmates are also, overwhelmingly, people of color.... Among young black men,
up to 30 percent has a history of incarceration.").
68. I identified these three elements based on analysis of a variety of sources, and then I
subsequently discovered that an early report from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute
of Corrections, identified similar versions of the first and second considerations in the imposition of
economic sanctions in the criminal justice system more generally. But the report had a different third
factor: "The taxpayer revolt, as it was called, [which] expressed a general and growing resistance to
taxes in the 197os. One remedy was to expand the practice of assessing user fees on the grounds that
those who use various publicly funded services ought to bear a larger part of the cost." MULLANEY,
supra note 7, at 1-2. I am inclined to see the "taxpayer revolt" as background that informs all of the
considerations that this Article identifies.
69. These decisions have often been rather ad hoc as opposed to debated fully on any potential
ground. See id. at vi.
70. See, e.g., Matthew J. Parlow, The Great Recession and Its Implications for Community
Policing, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1191, 1205-o8 (2012) ("[W]ith the financial downturn that the United
States-and the world more generally-has experienced in the past several years, localities
experienced severe reductions from virtually all of their revenue sources that dramatically impacted
their budgets," including "public safety budgets."). This Article notes that a few counties are using
"pay-to-stay" as a non-traditional revenue source but offers a limited sample, noting programs in just
three states. Id.at 1215-16.

December 20131

CAPTIVE MARKETS

more broadly."' Pay-to-stay programs have offered one such opportunity.
Second, political pressures arising in the face of limited financial
resources has allowed officials to justify billing inmates for their room
and board in response to the sentiment that it is unfair for criminals to
get a free ride while blameless citizens may go without housing and
food.72 Third, some officials have argued that pay-to-stay is not solely a
financial matter, but is also grounded in rehabilitation or deterrencethe primary objectives of criminal justice.73 Others have questioned the
desirability, or even legitimacy, of using pay-to-stay, or other charges
levied against criminal defendants, to further goals of or related to
punishment given their potential to lengthen sentences so that they
become disproportionate to the offense,74 to limit or prohibit
rehabilitation and reintegration post-release,75 and to disproportionately

71. See, e.g., Butterfield, supra note 34, at At (stating that "grappl[ing] with soaring prison
populations and budget pressures" has led "more local governments" to resort to "more frequently
billing inmates for their room and board."); see also Parlow, supra note 70, at 1213-16 (describing
attempts in some localities to find new sources of revenue for jails and police departments).
72. See, e.g., KRAurH & STAYTON, supra note 2, at 15 ("A few survey respondents [jail
administrators] noted that their per diem charges are actually a result of political pressure from the
public."); Butterfield, supra note 34, at As (quoting then Sheriff of Macomb County, Michigan as
saying that "the public loves [pay-to-stay programs].... What we say is, 'Why should we as taxpayers
have to pay the whole cost of incarcerating these people who break the law?"'). Indeed, "increasingly
prison researchers dismiss ... 'pay-to-stay' plans as political grandstanding, citing the difficulty and
expense of actually collecting anything from inmates and the ethics of such practices." Julia Silverman,
Inmates Charged Again-For Stay, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, May 23, 2004, at A24. While I agree that

political pressures may exert significant influence on the decision to institute pay-to-stay programs, I
do not agree that implementation is mere posturing, given the significant consequences that such
programs may have on inmates' lives, among other reasons. See infra Part I.B.2.e.
73. See, e.g., DALE PARENT, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECOVERING CORRECTIONAL
CosTs THROUGH OFFENDER FEES 2 (June 199o) ("Some practitioners have suggested that [correctional]

fee payment has a therapeutic effect... offenders demonstrate accountability and responsibility to the
victim and to the criminal justice system."); see also Amy Sherman, Inmates' Jail Fee Yields Little
Green: 'Pay-to-Stay' Program Was to Offset Counties' Cost, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 14, 2003, at

Ci ("During the past year, at least one-quarter of Minnesota counties started charging for room and
board [in jail].... [Tihe purpose was two-fold: bring in money to help offset ever-rising jail costs and
send a message to criminals that 'if you do the crime, you pay to do the time."'). But see Pan, supra
note 62, at Boi (quoting county corrections chief as explaining "I'm not here to punish the offender
any more.... I just want them [inmates] to pay what's reasonable and sound for the taxpayers").
74. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 35, at 239 ("The moral culpability of the offender requires
that he or she be punished, but only as far as is deserved. With ... [economic] sanctions [including
costs related to the criminal case], most people pay a lot more than an eye for the eye."); see also
Mullaney, The Fee Fad, supra note 6o, at 7 (identifying "some undesirable and unanticipated
consequences [of correctional fees] that concern probation and parole officials [as] includ[ing]:
Punishment of offenders at a level above that intended by the legislatures when originally instituting a
system of sanctions").
75. See, e.g., BANNON ETAL., supra note 5, at 27 ("In all of the fifteen states studied, criminal
justice debt [which may include pay-to-stay] and related collection tactics pose severe hurdles in
virtually every area of life" during defendants' "reentry and rehabilitation" post-conviction).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:57

impact low-income and minority individuals. 76 Debate over the role of
pay-to-stay has itself become part of popular political dialogue, showing
that these three factors may overlap.77
As for the question of how many counties today have implemented
pay-to-stay, there does not appear to be a comprehensive or definitive
account of the prevalence or nature of such programs nationwide. 8
Three reports reflecting results from surveys from a sample of jails
nationwide appear to come closest: one from the National Institute of
Justice in I99o" and two from the National Institute of Corrections in
1997 and 2005." Examining these reports in conjunction with information
from other sources reveals the contours of an overall nationwide trend
toward the use of pay-to-stay over the last several decades.8'
At the time of the 199o report, twenty-six states had laws imposing
some type of fee on jail inmates.2 Among survey respondents, 83 room
and board fees comprised almost all types of correctional fees that were
collected."' However, room and board charges by jails were primarily
levied against work-release inmates as opposed to those serving "straight

76. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 54, at 1789-91 (explaining that "monetary sanctions create
additional mechanisms by which criminal conviction contributes to the reproduction of poverty and
inequality... . monetary sanctions may contribute to, and help to explain, racial inequality in
household wealth").
77. See, e.g., Editorial, Fees for Jail Service, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 4, 2011, at A6 (criticizing
sheriff's "controversial proposal to make inmates pay for their stays in the county jail ...[because]
broader questions about fairness must be considered").
78. See Butterfield, supra note 34, at Ai ("There are no national data on how much is being
collected [from inmates], reflecting the patchwork of policies, but fees are being levied for ... room
and board.").
79. See generally PARENT, supra note 73.
8o. See generally NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12;see also KRAUTH & STAYTON, supra note 2.
The National Institute of Corrections also issued a report on economic sanctions in 1987 based on
thirty-five interviews with various constituencies and a literature review. See generally MULLANEY,
supra note 7. For various reasons, it does not offer that helpful a basis of comparison for the three
subsequent survey reports because it does not tie its descriptions of practices to specific jurisdictions.
8I. But see Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1607 n.148 (2003)
("[S]ome [prison and jail] facilities are authorized by state law to charge inmates for the costs of their
own incarceration. Many facilities rarely exercise this authority for inmates who are not on work
release or working in relatively high-paying 'prison industries' jobs."). Schlanger's observation is not
necessarily in tension with my claim that-from a nationwide perspective-pay-to-stay programs in
county jails specifically are more common today than they were prior to the 198os. I believe that she is
correct in that many jails or state prisons in parts of the country likely do not charge inmates for their
incarceration; however, in other jurisdictions, many county jails in fact do. See, e.g., Rick Armon,
Sheriff Revives Proposal to Levy Jail Fees, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 2, 2o1i, at AI ("In 2007, the
Buckeye State Sheriffs' Association in Columbus [Ohio] estimated that 6o counties had a pay-to-stay
program."). Ohio has eighty-eight counties total. OHIo SEC'Y OF STATE, Ohio by the Numbers,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/ProfileOhio/numbers.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
82. See PARENT, supra note 73, at i.
83. There is no claim that this group constituted a representative sample. Id. at 3.
84. Id. at 6.
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time." 8' The report concluded that the use of correctional fees in general
was likely to accelerate, meaning that "the question of primary interest
appears not to be whether to use fees, but how to realize their potential
benefits."''
The prediction that the use of correctional fees was all but inevitable
seemed to be validated by the 1997 report, which "confirmed that the
charging of [incarcerated] inmate fees is both prevalent and increasing
among the agencies surveyed. ' ' 87 According to survey results, 8 "[a]t least
41 states have passed legislation authorizing assessment of inmate fees
for jail services and operations," a significant increase from less than a
decade before."' Sixteen of those statutes authorized a "per diem" charge,
and an additional two provided for the "general costs of incarceration," so
eighteen states (over thirty percent) permitted or required inmates to pay
some or all of the cost of their time in custody.' Thirteen jails (ten percent
of the total surveyed) across nine states9' charge inmates all or a portion
of the daily cost of their incarceration." Average program revenue
generated $125,000 per year for the relevant county's general fund.93
Here, the report again predicted further growth in fee use.94
The 2005 report supported the claim of a trend toward imposing
financial charges on inmates.9' This most recent report found that thirty85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 1, 2. Not all researchers saw the same capacity for fees imposed on criminal defendants
to have a positive societal impact: In i988, a researcher affiliated with the National Institute of
Corrections called for a "moratorium on fee development. Unguided by principles of coherent
operating policy, we are creating a Frankenstein capable of bludgeoning its creators." Mullaney, The
Fee Fad, supra note 6o, at 6.
87. NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12, at 2.

88. Id. at I(explaining that survey was representative but "not intended as a comprehensive scan
of fees charged by all the nation's 3,200-plus jails"). It seems unlikely that any city jails were included
among survey recipients. See id. at 9 (referring to per diem fees going to "the county general fund").
But to the extent any might have been, it does not seem likely that they would represent a significant
portion, given the focus on larger facilities.
89. Id. at 2.
9o. Id. at 3,6.
91. The states involved in the survey were Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey,

South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. See id. at 8.
92. Specifically, thirteen jails-across nine states-were doing it out of 130 total surveyed. Id. at I,
7, 9. It is possible that this number might under-represent the number of jurisdictions where inmates
were paying toward their confinement costs, as it is not clear whether the survey given to jails asked
whether only the jails were collecting these costs or whether another entity-such as a court clerkmight have been collecting them instead.
93. Id. at 9. It is unclear if this figure represents gross or net revenue, the latter of which would
presumably account for such costs as running the program and collecting from inmates.
94. Id. at i8. The report noted some tension surrounding pay-to-stay: "Since the expense of
housing and caring for prisoners has traditionally been viewed as a public responsibility, charging
inmates is somewhat controversial." Id. at 7.
95. The survey did not reflect a representative national sample. KRALJTH & STAnrON, supra note 2,

at 4. It seems more likely that city jails were included here than in the 1997 survey, given that this
survey was sent to "small jails (inmate population less than 50)," not just large facilities. Id. at 2.
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eight percent of responding jails imposed some type of "pay-to-stay" fee,
for housing, meals, or both. 6 This is more than triple the number of jails
that reported doing so in 1997 .' The most common housing and meals
fee for inmates was twenty dollars.0 Jails in eleven states reported using
pay-to-stay, and one other state considered the practice, a small increase
from the number of states reporting pay-to-stay in the 1997 survey.'
However, this number under represents the prevalence of pay-to-stay
programs; since 2000, jails in at least half of all states have adopted or
have considered adopting these programs."0 This report did not offer a
prediction about the trajectory of fee usage, although it offered guidance
on implementation.''
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a definitive empirical
conclusion on whether fee use has proliferated nationwide since 2005
and, if it has, whether it will continue to do so. There is a well-supported
sense among those who have studied the levying of financial charges

However, "raw data" from the survey is presented according to county, which could suggest that only
county facilities were studied. See id. at app. B. Even if some local facilities are included in these
numbers, it is only another reason to regard existing data as inadequate for establishing a definitive
number of counties nationwide that have pay-to-stay programs.
96. Id. at 29. Charging for both is most common: sixty-seven jails out of seventy-seven. Id.; see
also Miller, supra note 62, at 2 ("Prison researchers estimate that a third of the nation's 3,000-some
county jails levy room and board fees.").
97. See supra note 92; KRAUTH & STAYTON, supranote 2, at 8.
98. KRAUTH & STAYTON, supra note 2, at 29 (referring to regular, non-work-release inmates).
99. Compare NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12, at 7, with KRAUTH & STAYTON, supra note 2, at

app. B. In 2005, states reporting pay-to-stay programs in jails (listed by county so likely county-level
facilities) were Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Illinois was considering it. See KRAUTH &STAYTON,
supra note 2, at app. B. Id.
Ioo. This figure is based on the 2005 survey, as well as other sources (which are not intended to be
comprehensive). Case law reveals that counties in states not listed in the 2005 report also currently
have pay-to-stay or have had it since 2000. See, e.g., Iowa v. Bogdan, No. 10-1156, 2oi I WL 6660603
(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (Pottawattamie County, Iowa); State v. Fleming, No. io4,944, 2O1 WL

6413629 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011) (Mitchell County, Kansas) (holding ordinance imposing per
diem for jail stay to be invalid for failing to comply with statutory requirements); Brown v. Hickman,
No. 10-3052, 2011 WL 4368393 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 25, 2011) (Boone County, Arkansas,); Sickles v.

Campbell Cnty., 439 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (Campbell and Kenton Counties, Kentucky);
Souza v. Sheriff of Bristol Cnty., 455 Mass. 573 (2010) (Bristol County, Massachusetts) (striking down
county room and board fee due to lack of authorizing state statute). Newspaper reports expand the list
of states with pending, current, or recent (since 2000) programs. See, e.g., Laura Bauer, Some Inmates
Pay for

Their

Crimes and Jail Stays,

KAN.

CITY

STAR,

Apr.

24,

2009,

available at

www.jocosheriff.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=4 7 (Maricopa County, Arizona, and
Taney County, Missouri); Manny Gonzales, Bexar Inmates to Find That Freedom Isn't Free; Some Will
Be Getting Bills for Their Time Behind Bars, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws, Sept. 5, 2003, at Aot
(Bexar County, Texas); Medina, supra note 3, at As5 (Riverside and other counties, California); Ken
O'Brien, Pay-to-Stay Jail Plan Projections Released, CHI. TRIBUNE, Mar. 9, 2005, at 4 (Will County,
Illinois); Arthur Raymond, County Oks ChargingInmates, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Apr. I, 2009, at

BoI (Salt Lake County, Utah); Matt Wilson, Brief: Hamilton County Commission Raises Jail Fee to
$51, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Apr. 16. 2008 (Hamilton County, Tennessee).
ioi. KRAUTH & STAYTON, supra note 2, at 40.
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against criminal defendants that the general practice will continue to
grow.' 2 It at least seems reasonable to apply this intuition to pay-to-stay
specifically, after comparing the three reports described above. But even
looking at the three surveys together does not yield unimpeachable
evidence of an upward trend from 1988 to 2005 in the number of jails
across the country using pay-to-stay. 3 It is thus difficult-if not
impossible-to draw conclusions about the trend in pay-to-stay
implementation just by comparing the three. A comparison of the number
of states where jails reported pay-to-stay in 1997 and 2005 does at least
suggests at least that the practice of pay-to-stay grew around the turn of
the century.
The proliferation of state statutes promoting pay-to-stay programs is
perhaps the most definitive indicator of their prevalence. The 1997
report stated that eighteen states had some type of pay-to-stay statute in
place, which appears to have been a slight underreporting of the real
number." 4 Nevertheless, it is clear that more pay-to-stay laws are on the
books in states today than were in effect at the close of the twentieth
century. Currently, statutes in more than thirty states require or permit
the imposition of some type of pay-to-stay arrangement on jail inmates
by some governmental entity.' Because this figure is an increase from
102. See Ruback & Clark, supra note 35, at 752 (predicting that "economic sanctions" -defined as
"court-imposed obligations requiring offenders to pay money"-"are likely to be used more
frequently in the future."); see also Harris et al., supra note 54, at 1756 ("Our findings indicate that
penal institutions are increasingly imposing a particularly burdensome and consequential form of debt
on a significant and growing share of the poor.").
103. Among other reasons, the 199o and 2oo5 surveys were not distributed to a representative
sample of jails. See supra notes 83, 95.
104. NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12, at 8. The 1997 report is the only one of three surveys that
identified each state with a pay-to-stay statute by name. But some states with such statutes in effect by
1996 -when the survey was circulated -were not listed, so I hesitate to rely on the exact figure of pay-tostay statutes listed in this report. See NAT'L INST. OF CORR.,supra note 12, tbl.I (omitting Maine's charges
for room and board from the list); but cf.ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 (2013) (permitting charges
for room and board since 1996). However, most of the discrepancies that I uncovered still show these laws
being added in the last quarter of twentieth century or later, which is consistent with the observed general
trend toward passage of such laws as compared to pre-I98o. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 1341 (authorizing courts to assess room and board reimbursement-payable to county-against inmate
sentenced to county jail); Mo. REv. STAT. § 221.070 (2013) (requiring jail inmates to be liable for their
support while incarcerated); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-4-115 (2013) (authorizing county mayor to bring civil
suit against inmate for reimbursement of maintenance and support while in jail).
1O5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-22(a)(i) (1975); ARIz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 13-804.oI(A) (2002);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-129(a)(i)(A) (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.Ic(a) (West 1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1.3-701(4) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § I8-85a(b) (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951.033(3)
(West 1996); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2o-6o7(I)(a) (i997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/20 (i993); IND.
CODE § 3 6-2-13-I5(d)(I) (1998); IOWA CODE ANN § 356.7(l) (West 1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 191930(d)-(e) (1963); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.045(I) (1942); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:705 (A)(2)
(1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341(); MIcH.COMP. LAWS § 8oi83(i)(a) (1984); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 64I.I2(3)(A) (West 1946); Mo. REV. STAT. § 221.070 (2013); Mor. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2245(I)
(1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 211.120(2)(C) (2010); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 30-B:I9(II) (2008); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-313 (2013); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.I8(A)(5)(a)(ii) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
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the reported 1997 numbers, it follows that the number of jails authorized
to impose such a charge has increased over the last couple of decades.
Not all jails in the states that permit the charge avail themselves of this
opportunity; indeed, it is possible in some of these states that a majority
of jails do not."' The available information outlined above, however,
suggests that the trend has been toward rather than away from using payto-stay programs.
Variety of Pay-to-Stay
"Pay-to-stay" statutes-as well as the county-level legislation,
policies, and practices that they enable-are far from uniform." Among
the many differences within the body of pay-to-stay legislation,
regulation, and implementation, some variants are particularly salient for
understanding the basic contours of the lender-borrower relationshiploan origination, loan repayment, and loan delinquency or defaultcreated between counties and inmates. These distinctions include which
institution or individual has the authority to impose the pay-to-stay
obligation; whether repayment while incarcerated is mandatory or
voluntary; what collection methods are available to the county (or its
designee) after an inmate has been released; whether mitigating factors
exist in the imposition or collection of reimbursement; and what the
potential consequences for non-payment are. These distinctions could
2.

§ 979a(A) (1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 137.540 (1990); S.D. CODIIED LAWS § 24-I1-45 (1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 41-11-103 (2012); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.038(a) (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-201(6) (LexisNexis 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.3 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760
(2) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-14(a) (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. § 304.074 (995); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 7-13-1o9(a) (1996). Counties in at least two additional states have implemented pay-to-stay
absent express authorization: Pennsylvania and New Jersey. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 423 (3d Cit. 2000) (reviewing incarceration cost recovery statute from Lebanon
County, Pennsylvania); Jessica Bruder, One Room, Dreadful View, and It Could Cost You, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2004, at 3 (reporting on incarceration fee payment program from Camden County,
New Jersey). States that have added pay-to-stay statutes or amended existing statutes to include payto-stay provisions between 1997 and 2005 (inclusive of those years) include Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804.01 (added
by Laws 2002, Ch. 337, § I); IDAHO CODE § 20-607 (added by 1997, ch. 102, § I, p. 236); IND. CODE § 362-13-15 (added by Pub. L. No. 123-1998, § 2 (2012)); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 534.045 (added by 2002 C.
183, § 39, effective 8-i-o2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 641.12 (amended by Laws 2002, c. 322, § I); OR. REv.
STAT. § i69.151 (997 C. 349, § 2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38A-102(6) (added by Laws 2003, C. 280); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.3 (H.B. 2765 (2003) (making c. 86o effective)); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-14, ( c.
67, effective June 1I, 2004).
io6. See, e.g., Amy Sherman, Jail to ChargeInmates for Bed/Board Dakota County Sets Fee at $20
a Day, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 17, 2002, at Ai (citing editor of American Jails magazine for
proposition that "most jails... don't charge boarding fees").
io7. See NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12, at 8; BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, COUNCIL OF
STATE Gov'Ts JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS II (2OO7). This heterogeneity has been true of fees
imposed on criminal defendants since the current movement toward the use of such fees began in the
197os. See, e.g., MULLANEY, supra note 7, at 2, 5 ("[V]irtually all of these [economic] sanctions are
subject to local state variance.").
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significantly shape the administration of the program by officials and the
experience of inmates.'O' The descriptions that follow aim to provide a
general overview of the variety between-and sometimes withinjurisdictions rather than a fifty-state survey of all relevant legislation,
regulation, policies, or practices that compose this complex terrain."
a. Imposing Authority
Depending on the jurisdiction, any of the government's branches
could be responsible for imposing the pay-to-stay obligation. The judicial
and executive branches possess this authority more often, however, than
the legislative branch."0 The variety among which individual or entity has
the authority to impose the obligation is reflected in the scattering of
pay-to-stay provisions among criminal or criminal procedure codes in
some jurisdictions as opposed to civil codes in others."' Even when such
authority lies with the court, some states impose this obligation during
sentencing or related proceedings in the underlying criminal case." 2 In
io8. Compare, e.g., KRAuTH & STAYrON, supra note 2, at 37 (reporting that one jail administrator
said the "daily subsistence fee is successful because it is taken from the inmate's account on a daily
basis. Even though approximately three-quarters of our inmates are indigent, this fee raises significant
funds."), with id. at 38 (quoting a report by another administrator that it "is very difficult to collect the
per diem fees because many inmates are indigent").
io9. Indeed, information about pay-to-stay and related topics often proves opaque even to
practitioners or officials within a given jurisdiction. See, e.g., BUtREAU OF JusricE ASSISTANCE, supra
note 107, at 12 (recommending that policymakers convene working groups to "elicit key information

about how collections [of debts arising from incarceration] are made pursuant to existing laws and
policies" and cautions that "veteran court or probation staff may be unable to list, for example, all of
the fines, fees, and surcharges in a given city, county, or state").
iio. Several states require a court order for the obligation to attach to individual inmates: see, e.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804.0i(A) (requiring court orders for the reimbursement of incarceration

costs); CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 18-1.3-7o1(i)(a) (authorizing the court to render judgment against offender
for cost of care); LA. REv. STAT.

ANN.

§ 15:705(A)(2)(b)

(permitting the sheriff to collect

reimbursement for room and board if approved by judge); ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 1341(l)
(authorizing courts to assess room and board reimbursement). Sheriff or jail administrator can impose
pay-to-stay obligation on individual inmates without initial court orders, although recourse to courts
may be necessary in event of nonpayment: see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 951.033(3) ("[Chief correctional
officer of a local subdivision may direct a prisoner to pay for all or a fair portion of daily subsistence
costs."); IowA CODE ANN. § 356.7(l) (authorizing a county sheriff to charge inmates for room and
board); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.3 (permitting a sheriff or jail superintendent to establish a program

to charge inmates per diem fee). Pay-to-stay obligation attaches to inmates solely due to legislative
action establishing the general obligation. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-2-13-15(c), (e), (f) (establishing

that an inmate "shall reimburse the county" at rate set by "county fiscal body" and collected by sheriff);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-I 93o(d)-(e) ("[B]oard of county commissioners may provide by resolution that any
inmate of the county jail.., shall be required to pay to the county a fee ... to defray the costs of
maintaining such inmate in the county jail.").
iii. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804.O1 (Arizona Criminal Code); COLO. REV. STAT. I81.3-701 (2012) (Colorado Criminal Code); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2245 (1978) (Montana Local
Government-Civil); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 979a (i99o) (Oklahoma Criminal Procedure); W. VA. CODE

ANN. § 7-8-14 (LexisNexis 2oio) (West Virginia County Commissioners & Officers, Civil).
I12. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A76O(2) (2011) (requiring a judicial determination of
reimbursement obligation to be made at sentencing); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-I3-I09(a) (1996) (same).
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others, county officials or prosecutors must commence a separate civil
proceeding if they wish to obtain a court order for repayment.'1 3
b. Repayment While Incarcerated
In many jurisdictions, an individual inmate's pay-to-stay obligation
remains in place during his time in jail, usually as the result either of his
criminal sentence or of a program at the jail.. The inmate may thus be
required to start making payments while still behind bars."5 However, it
is not always clear when repayment must begin, even when the pay-tostay obligation is imposed during the course of the inmate's custody." 6
Practically speaking, repayment may prove difficult to enforce against
inmates, as their sources of income are generally limited or non-existent
while they are incarcerated."' Some jurisdictions have sought to address
this obstacle by incorporating inmates' commissary accounts into pay-tostay schema, either by providing the option for inmates to use them as a
source of payment or by requiring that they do so."' In the latter
113. See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS § 8oi.87(I) 0984) (granting the county six years after inmate's
release to bring a "civil action to seek reimbursement from that person for maintenance and support
of that person while he or she is or was confined in the jail"); Wis. STAT. § 302.372(6)(a) (1995)
(granting a county one year after inmate's release from jail to "commence a civil action in circuit court
to obtain a judgment for the costs under sub. 2(a) [including daily maintenance] or be barred").
114. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.760(2) (requiring a judicial determination of
reimbursement obligation made at sentencing); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.3 (permitting a sheriff or
jail superintendent to establish a program to charge inmates per diem fee).
115. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14 -6-22(b)(I) (I975) (requiring defendants ordered to pay housing and
maintenance costs to do so "forthwith" unless court specifically authorizes payment plan); FLA. STAT.
§ 95 1.033(5) (permitting chief correctional officer in jail to "seek payment for the prisoner's subsistence
costs" from multiple sources, including "[tihe prisoner's cash account on deposit at the [jail] facility");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § i9-193o(e)(3) (1963) (requiring an inmate to pay maintenance fee by cash, money
order, or jail commissary account); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 64i.12(3)(a) (West 1946) ("[Closts may be
collected at any time while the person is under sentence or after the sentence has been discharged."). At
least one jurisdiction, Montana, requires that confinement costs "must be paid [by inmate] in advance of
confinement and prior to payment of any fine." MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2245(I).
116. See, e.g., MNNN. STAT. ANN. § 64i.I2(3)(a) ("[C]osts may be collected at any time while the
person is under sentence or after the sentence has been discharged."); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 4 2.0 3 8(f) (West 1999) (authorizing sentencing court to "require a defendant to reimburse the
county [for per diem cost of confinement] ... by paying to the sheriff the bill presented by the sheriff
within a specified period or in specified installments").
117. See, e.g., PARENT, supra note 73, at I ("[O]pponents of correctional fees note that many
correctional clients are indigent.., and even non-indigent offenders may be poor payment risks."); see
also ACLU, supra note so, at 53 (quoting a sheriff of one Ohio county as saying that "his county's plan
to charge prisoners has been a 'complete failure ... [w]hen it came time to collect the pay-to-stay, it
ended up costing almost as much if not more to run the program"' due to inmate indigency). Cf.
BANNON ETAL., supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that "[clriminal defendants are overwhelmingly poor").
18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951.033(5) (permitting chief correctional officer in jail to "seek
payment for the prisoner's subsistence costs" from multiple sources, including the "prisoner's cash
account on deposit at the [jail] facility"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § i9-i93o(e)(3) (requiring inmates to pay
maintenance fee by cash, money order, or jail commissary account); Wis. STAT. § 302.372(5)
(authorizing jailer to deduct reimbursement costs from inmate's "institutional account... for payment
for items from canteen, vending or similar services" if inmate permitted to maintain such account).
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scenario, then, the sheriff or other correctional officer is typically
authorized to debit the account directly for payment.' 9 Given the
relatively small number of statutes specifically authorizing it, direct debit
does not appear to be the dominant approach for facilitating pay-to-stay
reimbursement.'20 However, other statutes give judicial, county, or
correctional officials considerable discretion to set the terms of
repayment, which suggests that direct debit could potentially have a role
in jurisdictions other than those in states where statutory provisions
explicitly authorize it.' 2'

One company has played a particularly significant role in facilitating
the use of direct debit for pay-to-stay obligations, as well as assisted
counties with collection more broadly: Intellitech, a private corporation
based in Ohio.'2 Like a typical collection agency,'23 Intellitech generally
keeps a percentage of the amount it receives from an inmate. The
percentage is meant to be linked to difficulty of recovery: the more
difficult the recovery, the greater the company's compensation.'24 In
some contracts, Intellitech's cut of funds collected from incarcerated
inmates is thirty percent, with the figure more than doubling to seventy

I 9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951-033(5); WIs. STAT. § 302.372(5); KRAUTH & STAYTON, supra note
at 37 ("[D]aily subsistence fee is successful because it is taken from the inmate's account on a daily
basis. Even though approximately three-quarters of our inmates are indigent, this fee raises significant
funds." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. It appears that less than twenty percent of states have statutes specifically authorizing direct
debit of inmate accounts for pay-to-stay costs-without consent of the inmate. See, e.g., FLA. ST.
§ 951.033(5); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § I25/20(a)-(a-5) (2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 64I.12(3)(a); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 979a(A) (West 1990); WIs. STAT. § 302.372(5). Cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19I93o(e)(2)(C) (permitting county to garnish an inmate's commissary account if housing costs not paid,
following notice and hearing).
121. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-22(a)(3) (1975) (granting court authority to determine the
"method of payment" of housing and maintenance costs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203. lc(a) (West 1982)
(permitting court to order repayment of incarceration costs "in the manner in which the court believes
reasonable"); IND. CODE ANN. § 3 6-2-1 3 -15 (f) (West 1998) (requiring sheriff to collect pay-to-stay
costs "in conformity with the procedures specified in the [county] ordinance adopted"); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:705(C)(3)(a) (1989) (permitting "withdrawals specifically authorized by the sheriff" from
inmate accounts but not naming pay-to-stay costs in statute).
122. About Us, INTELLITECH, www.intellitechcorp.com/about.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). In
2007, it was estimated that roughly sixty counties in Ohio had pay-to-stay in place and reported that
"[m]any of the[se] jails contract with the same company... Intellitech Corp. of Poland, Ohio." Carol
Biliczky, Summit Sheriff Wants Inmates to Pay, AKRON BEACON J., July 26, 2007, at At.
123. In the words of the director of finance for the Summit County Sheriff's office, which hoped to
work with Intellitech: "When the inmates leave the county jail... 'Intellitech becomes basically a
,
collection agency."' Ed Meyer, Pay-for-Jail-StayPlan Opposed, AKRON BEACON J., July 31 2007, at B2.
124. See Board Meeting: April 25, 2012, Corrs. Ctr. of Nw. Ohio (Aug. 7, 2013), available at
www.ccnoregionaljail.org/prbdo42512.htm ("An Intellitech representative told [Corrections Center of
Northwest Ohio] board members that the higher revenue is needed to cover staff and legal costs as
well as deal with poor creditors [sic., seems to have meant debtors].").
2,
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percent for post-release inmates.'25 One academic study concluded that
Intellitech was a costly option. 1 6 But many counties in Ohio have seen
and continue to see it as necessary.' 7 Intellitech has also provided its
trademarked "Pay-For-Stay" services in at least eight states other than
Ohio and has been involved in legislative reform efforts in at least six or
so others. ' These numbers are significant. Intellitech has been involved
in pay-to-stay (in some capacity) in at least thirty percent of all states.'29
This statistic suggests that pay-to-stay programs are providing fertile
ground for collaboration between the criminal justice system and the
private sector.
c. Post-Release Collection
Once an inmate has been released, counties can try to collect any
outstanding pay-to-stay debt using methods that tend to fall into one of
two broad categories: (i) those means available to all creditors, and
(2) those available to counties by virtue of their status as government
creditors collecting a specific financial obligation. Within a given
jurisdiction, both may be available.'30 Counties-or their designated subdivisions, officials, or other agents' 3' - typically may use any means that a
125. Id. (describing jail contract where jail "is entitled to 70 percent of any jail reimbursement
funds collected while the inmate remains incarcerated.. . . once released, collection revenues are
reduced with CCNO [jail] only getting 30 percent while Intellitech maintains 70 percent").
126. Robert Hoiles, Portage Considers Billing Inmates: Commissioner Looking at Plan to Make
PrisonersPay for Their Stays in Jail,AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 17, 1999, at B2.
127. See supra note 122.
128. As of 2003, the "company is involved in the legislation process in about 6 more states, and has
installations in nine states now" according to Bruce Foster, VP of Sales at Intellitech. Donna Rogers,
The Automation Revolution, CORREc-rONS F., Mar. 1, 2003 at 86.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., MIcH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 801.87-801.83 (2013) (authorizing civil suit against inmate for
reimbursement and authorizing court to make reimbursement a condition of probation); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 979a(C) (West 199o) ("Costs of incarceration shall be a debt of the inmate owed to the
municipality, county, or other public entity responsible for the operation of the jail and may be
collected as provided by law for collection of any other civil debt or criminal penalty.").
131. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2o-6o7(5)(a) (West 1997) (authorizing county representative to
bring civil suit for reimbursement within one year of inmate's release); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 125/20(a) (West 2013) (allowing the county board to request that "State's Attorney of the county in
which [the] jail is located" bring civil suit against the inmate to recover incarceration expenses).
Sometimes court officials are tasked with some, part or all of the collection effort, but funds collected
as pay-to-stay repayment typically go to the county. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.76o(ii)(a)
(2013) ("[The] administrative office of the courts shall mail individualized periodic billings to the
address known by the office for each offender with an unsatisfied legal financial obligation" and the
billings "shall direct payments... to the county clerk"). However, there may still be opportunities for
the judicial system to collect monies for itself related to such repayment, such as fees or interest. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-II-boI.6(I)-(2) (2012) (requiring defendant responsible for paying for cost
of jail care also to pay the court clerk at least one "time payment fee" and one or more "late penalty
fees" if applicable; these fees are "credited to the judicial collection enhancement fund ... in the state
treasury"). Sometimes, defendants may be charged with pay-to-stay obligations both to the county and
the state. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-3o4(a)--(a)(2b) (2013) (requiring all defendants found
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garden-variety private creditor operating in that jurisdiction could use to
obtain money owed to it.'32 These methods may involve non-judicial
intervention, such as requesting the money through phone calls, letters,
or other communication. 3 3 It is not uncommon for counties, like many
private creditors, to hire private collection agencies to perform this and
other functions.' 34 The inmate may be held responsible for any cost
incurred by the government's use of the collection agency.3 3 But
collection costs are assessed not only when a private entity is involved; an
inmate may be billed for them regardless of whether the collector is a
public or a private party."36
Collection methods may also involve judicial intervention if an inmate
fails to pay voluntarily. Here again, counties frequently undertake a
process similar to that of other creditors: obtaining and recording a civil
judgment against an inmate and executing the judgment through one or
more means.'37 Depending on the jurisdiction, counties may need to bring
a collection suit against the inmate in the appropriate civil court, as
would ordinary creditors.' 5 Once counties have obtained a civil
judgment, there are several generally available ways that they can elect
to execute it, including placing liens on, garnishing, or attaching certain
property belonging to the inmate.'39 Counties vary in their willingness to
criminally culpable "in every criminal case in the superior or district court" be charged fee for
"maintenance of misdemeanors in county jails... to be remitted to the Statewide Misdemeanor
Confinement Fund in the Division of Adult Correct of the Department of Public Safety"); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-313 (2013) (requiring pre-trial jail inmates pay per diem fee, unless found not criminally
culpable in some fashion).
132. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 641.12(3)(a) (West 1946) (authorizing "[county] board, or local
correctional agency or sheriff with authority over the jail ... [to] use any available civil means of debt
collection in collecting costs" of room and board from inmates).
133. See, e.g., WASH. Rav. CODE § 9.94A.76o(Ii)(a)-(b) ("[The] administrative office of the courts
shall mail individualized periodic billings to the address known by the office for each offender with an
unsatisfied legal financial obligation" and the billings "shall direct payments ... to the county clerk.").
134. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-ii-i01.6(3) (2013); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.28(F)(i)2929.37(D) (West 2013). See generally REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HIDDEN COSTS OF
FLORIDA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 21-22 (2010).
135. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-ii-ioi.6(3)

(permitting fees and costs of collection agent to be
up to twenty-five percent of the underlying amount collected from the inmate); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 29 29 .3 7 (D) (authorizing reimbursement coordinator to contract with private vendor to collect
unpaid judgment and may "collect costs associated with enforcement of the judgment").
136. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-2-I3-I5(d)(3)-(f) (1998) (charging inmate with collection costs and
making collection the responsibility of the sheriff or county attorney).
137. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 125/20(a) (West 2013).
138. See, e.g., id. (granting the county board authority to require inmate reimbursement for
incarceration expenses and may request that "State's Attorney of the county in which the jail is
located" bring civil suit against the inmate to recover these expenses); IOWA CODE § 356.7(I)-(2)
(949) (authorizing the sheriff, municipality, local prosecutor, or attorney for municipality to bring
reimbursement suit against inmate in district court if an inmate does not pay room and board charges).
139. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-22(C) (1975) (allowing sentencing court's assessment of costs of
housing and maintenance against inmate to "be collected by any means authorized by law for the
enforcement of a judgment"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-I.3-701(a) (permitting judgment for cost of care
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use such techniques, as these methods come with their own financial cost
that might be greater than the outstanding amount inmates owe. 4 '
In addition, counties often have specific techniques available when
collecting pay-to-stay obligations that typical private creditors do not.
This category may be subdivided further into those methods that do not
require judicial intervention and those that do. For example, in at least a
handful of states, counties do not need to involve the court to engage in
some forms of "self-help," such as taking funds from the commissary
account (or wallet) of a former inmate who is placed back in jail custody
on new charges but still has a previous outstanding pay-to-stay
obligation. 4 ' The more important difference arises with respect to court
involvement, as some jurisdictions do not require counties to bring civil
collection suits against inmates to obtain the equivalent of a civil
judgment. The imposition of the pay-to-stay obligation by the sentencing
court serves that function.'42 With the sentencing court's judgment in hand,
counties may be able to proceed with typical civil collection measures,
albeit sometimes under the continued jurisdiction of the criminal court.'43
Enforcing the pay-to-stay obligation against an inmate in criminal
rather than civil proceedings offers counties tools that are unavailable to
ordinary private creditors. It is of perhaps of greatest significance that
sentencing courts are often required or have the option to make pay-tostay reimbursement a condition of an inmate's supervised release, be it
parole or probation.'" Given the potential for a violation of these terms

assessed against defendant to "be enforceable in the same manner as are civil judgments"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 41-II-Io7(d) (LexisNexis 2012) (authorizing court to attach inmate's property to satisfy
civil judgment for reimbursement for jail support and maintenance costs); Wyo. STAT. § 7-I3-IO9(b)
(1996) (permitting the sheriff or prosecutor to request that "clerk of the sentencing court.., issue
execution against any assets of the defendant[,J including wages subject to attachment, in the same
manner as in a civil action").
140. See, e.g.,

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MACOMB CNTY.,

MICH.,

INMATE REIMBURSEMENT "PAY-TO-

3 (listing techniques including garnishing "wages, bank accounts, and tax refunds").
141. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 951.033(6) (1996) (providing that "chief correctional officer may place a
civil restitution lien against the prisoner's cash account or other personal property... [this] lien may
continue for a period of 3 years and applies to the cash account of any prisoner who is reincarcerated
within the county in which the civil restitution lien was originated").
142. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-22(C) (allowing sentencing court's assessment of costs of housing
and maintenance against inmate to "be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement
of a judgment"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 979a(C) (i99o) ("Costs of incarceration shall be a debt of the
inmate owed to the municipality, county, or other public entity responsible for the operation of the jail
and may be collected as provided by law for collection of any other civil debt or criminal penalty.").
143. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 221.070 (2013) (allowing the inmate's property to "be levied on and
sold, from time to time, under the order of the court having criminal jurisdiction in the county, to
satisfy such expenses" to satisfy inmate support obligation).
144. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-8o8(B) (1977) (requiring court to make payment of
incarceration cost a probation condition); IND. CODE § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(2I) (1991) (permitting court to
make reimbursement of confinement costs a condition of probation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 1341(5) (West 2013) (permitting room and board reimbursement to be a probation condition); MICH.
STAY" PROGRAM
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to result in re-incarceration, this measure exerts considerable pressure on
inmates to repay."4 The sentencing court may permit counties to access
inmate funds-perhaps by intercepting an inmate's state income tax
refund-when a standard creditor would not have such access. I46 Other
times, the effect of this jurisdiction may not be so different from that of a
civil court. For instance, following a reimbursement order entered by the
sentencing court, the court may modify the order following a review
hearing and other authorized officials may modify payment terms. 47'
Once payments are collected, it appears that they are most likely to
go into the county's general fund, regardless of the means employed. 8
The fund may require further allocation, such as designating a certain
amount for criminal justice operations.'49 It is not always clear whether
pay-to-stay collections are intended to supplement or to replace more
traditional forms of criminal justice funding. However, at least at the
outset of the current phase of using pay-to-stay and other jail-related
charges, it appears that jail administrators believed the intention was the
former.'50
d. Mitigation or Eliminationof Pay-to-Stay Obligation
There are two main ways in which the pay-to-stay obligation may be
reduced or eliminated: inmates' inability to pay, or proof of their
innocence. First, many jurisdictions have provisions to ensure that
inmates are not saddled with pay-to-stay obligations they cannot

CoMP. LAWS § 8oi.83(2) (1984) (permitting reimbursement for per diem cost of maintaining inmate to
be a probation condition).
145. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 20-22.
146. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-ii-Xoi.8 (2012) (tax refund offset); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.76o(3) (2011) (payroll deduction).
147. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.Ic(a) (West 1982) (permitting sentencing court to "hold

additional hearings [related to repayment of incarceration costs] during the probationary period" and
to "order the defendant to appear before a county officer.., to make an inquiry into the ability of the
defendant to pay"); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.76o(7)(a) (permitting, in some circumstances, either

supervising probation department or county clerk to modify payment amount without court hearing).
148. See NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12, at 8 tbl.3 (reporting that out of thirteen jails
responding to survey that charged per diems, all but one jail credited collections to county general

fund); see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151(6) (2013) (designating county general fund as recipient for
any reimbursement for custodial costs); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-109(d) (1996) (providing that room and
board reimbursement go to "county general fund to help defray the costs the jail facility incurred in
providing room and board to the person").
149. See, e.g., Chad Nation, Plan to Allow County to Resume 'Pay-to-Stay' Policy at Jail, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 30, 20O, at 3B ("60 percent of the [pay-to-stay] fees would have to be used for
law enforcement personnel costs, infrastructure improvements to the jail or courthouse security
equipment.").
15o. PARENT, supra note 73, at 18 ("It is difficult to 'prove' whether [offender] fee revenues offset
appropriations... Yet, seventy-seven percent of the jails.., believe that legislatures do not use fee
revenues to offset correctional appropriations ... where fee revenues do, in fact, offset appropriations,
incentive to collect is undermined.").
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afford.'5' The general presumption animating this consideration appears
to be that the obligation should be waived for indigent inmates and
reduced for those who are not indigent but have limited means.'52
Ability-to-pay determinations may be required or permitted at the
imposition phase, the collection phase, or both.' 3 While the relevant
governmental official or body must render a decision on the inmate's
ability-to-pay, responsibility for commencing such assessment does not
necessarily rest with the imposing or collecting authority.'54 The inmate
himself might need to raise the issue.' 55 The dominant approach seems to
consider the defendant's financial circumstances, but this is by no means
uniform. s6 Indeed, the American Bar Association Journalrecently stated

151. See NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12, at 9 (finding that "[albility to pay is considered in
most state laws that authorize charging inmates for costs of incarceration").
152. See, e.g., KRAUTH & STAYTON, supra note 2, at 40-41 (reporting jail administrators' belief that
"fee policies must take into account the fact that many inmates do not have the resources to pay fees
and, in fact, are often indigent.., several respondents noted, 'Some revenues from fees are better than
none."'). But see OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MACOMB CNTY., MICH., supra note 140, at 2-4 (establishing a
program that does not implement a sliding per diem cost to zero).
153. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § I2O3.Ic(a) (West 1982) (permitting the court to impose pay-tostay obligation following a hearing at which ability-to-pay is determined and to require defendant on
probation to appear before county officer for further consideration of ability-to-pay); IDAHO CODE
§ 2o-6o7(5)(a) (1997) (authorizing county to bring civil suit for reimbursement "only after determining
from the financial status form... that sufficient assets are available to justify further recovery efforts
and that further action to collect the daily expense for maintaining the sentenced person by the county
jail will not cause the sentenced person or his dependents to qualify for public assistance"); W. VA.
CODE § 7 -8-14(b) (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that "court may not sentence a defendant to pay his or
her costs of incarceration unless he or she is or in the reasonable future will be able to pay them").
154. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-I I-107(c) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring court, prior to issuing
reimbursement order, to "take into consideration any legal obligation of the defendant to support a
spouse, minor children or other dependents and any moral obligation to support dependents to whom
the defendant is providing or has in fact provided support"), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 64 1.12(3)(b)
(West 1946) (requiring sheriff or head of local correctional agency to waive pay-to-stay obligation
upon a determination that the inmate has no ability-to-pay but not specifying that sheriff or agency
head initiate investigation of the issue).
155. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 641.12(3)(b) (requiring sheriff or head of local correctional
agency to waive pay-to-stay obligation upon determination that the inmate has no ability-to-pay but
not specifying that sheriff or administrator initiate inquiry).
156. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607(5)(a) (1997) (permitting county to bring civil suit for
reimbursement "only after determining from the financial status form ... that sufficient assets are
available to justify further recovery efforts and that further action to collect the daily expense for
maintaining the sentenced person by the county jail will not cause the sentenced person or his
dependents to qualify for public assistance"); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-2-1 3 -I5(c)(3)-(d)(2) (1998)
(charging inmate "direct cost" of investigating indigent status but, if found to be indigent, inmate does
not have to pay investigation or per diem costs); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-11-45 (1995) (sentencing
judge "may waive all or part of the payment for the costs of the inmate's confinement" based on
various factors of the inmate's financial situation, including "number of dependents"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 41-11-107(c) (requiring court, prior to issuing reimbursement order against inmate, to "take
into consideration any legal obligation of the defendant to support a spouse, minor children or other
dependents and any moral obligation to support dependents to whom the defendant is providing or
has in fact provided support"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-14(b) (requiring sentencing court to make
ability to pay determination before issuing reimbursement order and providing that "court may not
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that although the "Supreme Court has unambiguously held that criminal
defendants can't be jailed for inability to pay through no fault of their
own... state courts across the country routinely ignore that command
and send people to jail without the required hearing to determine
whether a defendant is indigent."'' s In addition, many reports by
advocates suggest that certain courts and officials ignore inmates' personal
financial circumstances -including indigence-in imposing and collecting
debts related to criminal cases, such as pay-to-stay."' Even when lowincome defendants are permitted to pay according to a schedule that is
more feasible for them, their inability to pay the full amount owed
initially may cost them more money over time.'59 And defendants who
initially have limited or no means but later obtain jobs or other sources
of income may find themselves pursued for repayment at that time by
run.I60
counties, provided the applicable statute of limitations has not yet
Second, if defendants are not found guilty of the alleged crime-as a
result of jury verdict, the exercise of prosecutorial decision not to
proceed with the case, or other means-some jurisdictions do not need to
pay for time spent in jail as a result of pre-trial custody. I6' However, even
where only convicted inmates may be charged, the bill may encompass
time spent in pre-trial custody."' To the extent that there has been
movement on the issue of charging pre-trial
6 3 detainees, it appears to have
been away from the practice of doing so.

sentence a defendant to pay his or her costs of incarceration unless he or she is or in the reasonable
future will be able to pay them"). But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 979a(D) (199o) (prohibiting court from
waiving "costs of incarceration in their entirety").
157. John Gibeaut, Get Out of Jail-ButNot Free: Courts Scramble to Fill Their Coffers by Billing
Ex-Cons, A.B.A. J., July 2012, at 52. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 66o, 664-65 (1983).
158. See ACLU, supra note io, at 5-1o; BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 13 (concluding that "none
of the [fifteen] states studied. .. have adequate mechanisms to reduce criminal justice debt based on a
defendant's ability to pay").
159. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-304(a)(2b), 7A-304(f) (2013) (requiring that a defendant
wishing to repay "monetary obligations"-including fee for "maintenance of misdemeanors in county
jails"-using installment plan must "pay a onetime setup fee of twenty dollars ($2o.0o) to cover the
additional costs to the court of receiving and disbursing installment payments"); OHIo REV. STAT.
§ 2929.28(F)(3) (West 2013) (allowing offenders to be charged a "reasonable fee" when they choose
"payment plan rather than lump sum payment of any financial sanction").
16o. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MACOMa CNTV., MICH., supra note 140, at 6 (stating that civil
judgment against inmate is "good for ten years" and can be extended for another ten); Miller, supra
note 62, at 2 (quoting veteran administrator of the Macomb County jail program as explaining "'[w]e
started out small .... Now we're real [sic.] aggressive with our collection techniques").
i61. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 12, at 8 (stating that "[mlost state statutes
addressing per diem charges to not distinguish between pretrial and post-conviction inmates" but
mentioning several where only the latter must repay).
162. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS § 8oi.87(2)(b) (1984) (permitting civil lawsuit for reimbursement
to be brought against a pre-trial detainee eventually convicted for a felony).
163. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 10, at 53 (noting that Ohio state law "now allows jails and prisons
to charge [fees, including room and board to] only those prisoners who have been convicted of crimes"
due to "several long-running federal lawsuits"); Minnesota Supreme Court Ruling Cuts Chargefor
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e. Consequences of Non-Payment
Those current or former inmates who fail to fulfill their pay-to-stay
obligation may face one or more adverse consequences, depending on
the jurisdiction. At I64their most severe,
these consequences
165
acesmayo involve
ubi
the loss of liberty, property, the right to vote, ' 66 access to public
benefits,' 67 access to employment, '68 and other significant losses in key
areas of life.' 69 An inmate may be incarcerated for willful failure to fulfill
his obligation if doing so was a condition of probation. 70 There is also the
potential for nonpayment to result in an extension of supervision.' 7'
Probation revocation is not the only path to re-incarceration. The court
can hold the inmate in contempt for willful failure to follow the court's
pay-to-stay order and re-incarcerate him on those grounds.' 7' Loss of an
Jailed Inmates, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 2009, at A9 (reporting Minnesota
Supreme Court decision that counties may only charge convicted inmates for cost of confinement).
164. See Gibeaut, supra note 157, at 52 (describing how "[t]hreats of more jail time for
nonpayment [of criminal justice fees] ... constantly loom. Some critics worry heavy-handed tactics
used to collect from ex-offenders signal a return, in effect, to debtors' prisons, which were abolished in
the United States in the 183Os").
165. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MACOMB CNTY., MICH., supra note i4o, at 3 (describing
Sheriff's actions to collect on unpaid judgments: he has "garnish[ed] wages, bank accounts, and tax
refunds... [and] filed and collected with execution against property (taken vehicles, boats, mobile
homes, etc.)").
66. See Cammett, supra note 35, at 355 ("To date, voter restoration statutes [for felons] that
require the payment of criminal justice-related debt have been routinely upheld.").
167. See Gibeaut, supra note 157, at 53 (listing loss of public benefits as potential consequence of
non-payment of court fees-including pay-to-stay-in some jurisdictions).
168. Id. (describing how "[n]onpayment of court fees" which may include pay-to-stay "can inflict
damage on credit reports so severe that employers... who use them as background checks may think
twice about hiring" the former inmate).
169. See, e.g., id. (describing how "[nlonpayment of court fees" which may include pay-to-stay "in
some states can mean loss of one's driver's license").
170. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § t3-808(B) (2012) (requiring court to make repayment of
incarceration cost, if ordered, a probation condition); IND. CODE 99 35-31.5-I-t; 35-31.5-2-232, 35-38-22.3(a)(21) (2013) (permitting court to impose repayment of costs of confinement as probation
condition); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, 99 1341(5), 1341(1) (2012) (permitting room and board
reimbursement as a probation condition with non-payment as possible grounds for prosecutor to bring
motion for probation revocation); cf. MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 1O7, at 8 (concluding that
"inability of people released from prisons and jails to meet their financial obligations can contribute to
their reincarceration," citing a "study of probation revocations [that] found that 12 percent were due
at least in part to a failure to meet the financial portion of probation supervision requirements").
171. See, e.g., MULLANEY, supra note 7, at 18 (describing how "often ... the time in community
corrections programs is extended to allow full payment [of economic sanctions, which may include
pay-to-stay]" with the result that the "supervising agency faces ballooning caseloads, the need for
more staff, and increased costs").
172. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 7-I3-109(c) (2010) ("Willful failure or refusal to pay [room and board]
costs ordered under this section is punishable as contempt of court."); cf. BANNON ET AL., supra note 5,
at 22 (finding that "[a]t least eleven of the fifteen states examined in this report have statutes or
practices that authorize incarceration for willful failure to pay criminal justice debt [which may include
pay-to-stay], often under the guise of civil contempt"); ACLU, supra note so, at 43-46 (finding that
Ohio courts use their contempt powers to "keep individuals unable to pay their LFOS [legal financial
obligations, which may include room and board] ensnared in the criminal justice system").
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inmate's property may also occur through more than one mechanism,
such as garnishment or attachment to enforce a judgment obtained by
the county.'73
Inmates who default on repayment may also find it difficult to
obtain employment. In some jurisdictions, non-payment of a pay-to-stay
obligation may be reported to credit bureaus.'74 Employers increasingly
use credit reports in their hiring decisions.'75 Deleterious information
typically remains on a credit report for seven years. 76 Given the length of
post-release time that some counties have to pursue inmates for pay-tostay debt, as well as the duration of any resulting judgment, a former
inmate who is delinquent in repaying could have adverse information on
his credit report for several decades after completing his jail sentence.'77
Such information may result in his being unable to find employment, I"8
which limits his ability to earn money to pay his and his family's expenses
as well as his debt to the county.
Less severe consequences of failing to repay the obligation on time
may include financial penalties such as interest or late fees. The formerwhich may also apply to a non-delinquent pay-to-stay obligation repaid
over time -is not uncommon. ' It appears often to be imposed as a matter
of statutory provisions that apply to debts owed to the government from
civil or criminal proceedings as opposed to measures within pay-to-stay
173. See supra Part I.B.2.c. One type of property interest deserves its own mention: government
benefits. When pay-to-stay has been made a condition of probation or parole, non-payment may
render an inmate ineligible for benefits he has or may disqualify him if he applies. See BANNON ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 28 ("[U]nder federal law, individuals who violate a term of their probation or parole
are ineligible for federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) funds, as well as Food
Stamps, low-income housing and housing assistance, and Supplemental Security Income for the elderly
and disabled.").
174. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 27 (explaining that civil judgments-which may
include pay-to-stay-are "filed with the county clerk just like any other judgment and becomes public
information available for credit reporting agencies. And at least four states [all of which have pay-tostay] affirmatively report delinquent defendants to credit agencies in some contexts, typically via
private vendors contracted to help collect delinquent debt"); see also OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MACOMB
Cmv., MICH., supra note 140, at 3 (explaining that pay-to-stay accounts continued to appear on credit
reports even after people paid them off).
t75. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 5,at 27.
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 168ic(a) (2012).
177. For example, in Michigan, an inmate may be pursued in civil court for pay-to-stay debt for six
years post-release, and the resulting judgment may remain in effect for one ten year term. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 8OI.87(I) (2013); OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MACOMB CWrv., MICH., supra note 140, at 3.
178. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 27 ("By damaging credit, criminal justice debt
functions as ...[an] application hurdle for jobseekers.").
179. See, e.g., id. at 17 (identifying practice of or authority for imposing interest on criminal justice
debt-which may include pay-to-stay-in Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia). But cf.Gibeaut, supra note 157, at 54 (describing measure brought by Washington State
legislators in 2011 to "allow inmates to petition to eliminate or reduce the 12 percent interest on most
fines and [criminal justice] fees that accrue during incarceration. They acted after hearing horror
stories such as the tale of one inmate who entered prison with a $35,000 debt that ballooned to more
than $ioo,ooo by the time he was released").
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schema specifically."" Late fees are also common.' This device, as well
as charging inmates with any collection costs,8 ' may cause an inmate's
obligation to increase significantly over time. The next Part takes up the
issue of the nature of this underlying obligation.
II. PAY-TO-STAY OBLIGATION AS GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED LOAN
The typical pay-to-stay obligation is not an easy fit into a familiar
category of financial transactions between the state and its citizenry.
What is the government doing and, in turn, making inmates do when it
requires them to pay for the "service" of incarceration? Whether the
payment is described by the relevant statute or other authority as being
for room and board, a per diem, confinement, or by another label,' 83 the
essence of the requirement is the same and the terms are therefore
essentially interchangeable: inmates must pay some or all of the basic
costs of being maintained in the county's custody. That is, inmates are
paying for a space in a secure facility where they are constitutionally
required to receive a minimally decent standard of sustenance and
lodging.8,
To be sure, there is a punitive air about pay-to-stay programs. The
space provided to the inmates is in a carceral facility to which they have
been sentenced, and being forced to pay to stay, is hardly equivalent to
choosing to pay for accommodations elsewhere. 81 Indeed, existing
literature has frequently discussed pay-to-stay as part of a broader

18o. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/5-9-3(e), 125/20(a) (2012) (imposing nine percent annual
interest rate on defaulted payments [including confinement costs] required by criminal defendants);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-I, 7A-304(a)(2b) (2013) (fixing eight percent annual interest rate as legal rate,
which applies to civil judgment entered against criminal defendant for, inter alia, costs imposed by
sentencing court, which include fee for "maintenance of misdemeanors in county jails"); see also
BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 17 n.89.
181. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 17 (identifying practice of or authority for assessing
financial penalties for late or delinquent payments on criminal justice debt-including pay-to-stay-in
Arizona, California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas).
182. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. I7-A, § 1341(0) (2012) (room and board); IND. CODE § 36-2-13-15(e)
(2013) (per diem); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-i.3-7o(I)(a) (2013) (cost of care); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 30B:i9(II) (2013) (costs of incarceration); TEX. CODE CRuM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.038 (201) (confinement
expenses). But cf Mowr. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2245(I) (2013) (defining confinement costs broadly as
including "actual medical costs"). To the extent that a term encompasses a financial obligation beyond
pay-to-stay, the analysis in this Article should be understood as referring only to the pay-to-stay
portion, unless otherwise indicated.
184. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (I98i) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
guarantees prisoners "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"); see also Tillman v. Lebanon
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3 d Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen the government takes a person into
custody against his or her will, it assumes responsibility for satisfying basic human needs such as food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.").
185. Cf Tillman, 221 F.3d at 424 (Rendell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to pay-to-stay obligation as a "sentencing consequence").
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category of payments made by criminal defendants, such as monetary
sanctions or legal financial obligations, the implication being that any
payment made as the result of a criminal proceeding or conviction has a
punitive or at least unique quality.' 6 While such categorization is valid
and the resulting implications have merit, they do not offer a specific
answer to the question of what financial mechanism is at work in the payto-stay transaction. Not even firmly concluding that pay-to-stay constitutes
punishment would fully answer that question in light of the various forms
that financial punishment may take. 8 '
As the aim of this analysis is to identify the financial transaction
implicated in pay-to-stay, this Part proceeds by assessing how pay-to-stay
fits into the most logically applicable familiar categories of citizen-state
financial transactions- both punitive and non-punitive -before arguing
that a new category is in fact the best fit. It should be noted that the state
and federal courts that have analyzed pay-to-stay programs have by no
means reached consensus on-or necessarily even considered explicitlythe financial mechanism behind pay-to-sta4, although they have typically
held such programs to be constitutional.' This is due not just to the
complexity of the question but also to the variety of pay-to-stay
programs."" The analysis that follows considers the financial mechanism
behind the typical pay-to-stay arrangement; its conclusions should not be
construed as applying to all such programs nationwide.
A.

FAMILIAR FINANCIAL CATEGORIES

j.

Fines and Penalties

At first glance, the pay-to-stay charge might appear to be a fine.
Fines are "extract[ed] payments, whether in cash or in kind, as
punishment for some offense."'" Typically, the payments are set amounts
tied to both the severity of the offense and to the offender's financial
circumstances, 9 ' although judicial discretion also informs the amount
imposed.'92 Other financial penalties may be the functional equivalent of
186. See supra note 35.
187. See, e.g., Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2ooo) (quoting United States v.

Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)) ("[P]unishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the
division between the civil and the criminal law.").
188. See Mitchom, supra note I9,at 188. But see Butterfield, supra note 34, at At ("In a few cases,
courts have sided with the inmates on specific [constitutional] issues."). Cf Tillman, 221 F.3d at 416
("Courts have consistently found that there is no constitutional impediment to deducting the cost of
room and board from a prisoner's wages.").
189. See supra Part I.B.2.
19o. Wright, 219 F. 3 d at 914 (internal quotations marks omitted); see Beckett & Harris, supra note

i6,at 509 ("[F]ines in the United States are imposed largely at judges' discretion; they also supplement
rather than replace other criminal sanctions.").
191. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.03, 7.02 (Official Draft 1962).
192. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 6,at 514.
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fines-payments imposed explicitly as punishment-but bear a different
label.'93 The Eighth Amendment limits the scope of such punitive
payments, requiring that they be proportional to the severity of the
underlying offense; although the precise status of the Excessive Fines
Clause on states remains unclear, courts have frequently assumed that it
is binding or have relied on other legal authorities for the same general
principle. 94 Pay-to-stay programs thus have been challenged on this
Eighth Amendment ground, under the assumption that the pay-to-stay
obligation is a fine, penalty, or similar measure."5 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that a pay-to-stay program for Washington state prison
inmates-in which a percentage of certain deposits into an inmate's
commissary account was deducted for confinement costs-was subject to
this proportionality requirement of the Excessive Fines Clause but did
not violate it because "[b]y definition, it seems that a fine based on a
criminal's cost of incarceration will always be proportional to the crime
committed."' However, the Washington Court of Appeals did not agree
that the Excessive Fines Clause even applied to this particular statutory
scheme because its purpose was not punitive. 7 Other federal circuit
courts that have considered Excessive Fines Clause challenges to county

193. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 54, at 1759 (listing financial "penalties" as among the
potential consequences for criminal wrongdoing in California).
194. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010); Wright, 219 F.3d at 916; see also
Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines
Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 872-75 (2013) ("[L]ack of clarity even on the basic question of
whether the Excessive Fines Clause has been incorporated against the states."). The Eighth
Amendment is not the sole source of proportionality limitations on fines or criminal punishment
generally, however; other authorities, including state common law and constitutions, contain a
proportionality principle. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 133, I81 (8th ed. 2007).
195. Another potential category of financial transaction could fall under the Eighth Amendment's
protection against Excessive Fines: nominally civil measures-such as civil forfeiture-that function at
least in part to punish. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-622 (1993). Under this rationale,
even if the pay-to-stay obligation was found to be civil in nature, it potentially still could be construed
as punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. It should be noted that pay-to-stay is distinct from
civil forfeiture in a number of ways, notably that the latter is a proceeding brought against property,
not people. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (9th ed. 2009). More generally, Professor McLean
recently offered an argument for re-conceptualizing Excessive Fines jurisprudence to encompass
considerations of the abilities of those charged punitive payments to earn their livelihoods, which
offers a potential avenue for challenging the general category of criminal justice debt as applied to
indigent and low-income defendants. McLean, supra note 194, at 885-93.
196. Wright, 2I9 F.3d at 917 (concluding-without addressing incorporation issue-that the
Excessive Fines Clause applied but was not violated).
197. Id. at 916 (citing In re Pers. Restraint Petitions of Metcalf, 963 P.2d 911, 921 (Wash. Ct. App.
1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1041 (1999)).

December

20131

CAPTIVE MARKETS

pay-to-stay programs have tended to reject them, but have typically
punted on the question of the nature of the underlying obligation.'
In most jurisdictions, the underlying obligation does not amount to a
fine or a penalty because it is explicitly structured as reimbursement.'
The county has the legal obligation to provide a minimally decent
standard of sustenance and lodging to inmates in its custody.2" Thus,
regardless of whether the inmate ever pays for his stay, he is entitled to
receive room and board while under the county's control."' That is, the
county bears initial responsibility for paying for the inmate's stay.02 This
arrangement runs counter to the fundamental premise of fines and
penalties, which are the sole responsibility of the criminal defendant."°
Certainly, the county does not pay them. Of course, the proceeds of any
fine or penalty assessed could be applied toward the county's costs in
operating a jail without changing the nature of the fine or the penalty."4

198. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3 d 410, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2000)
(proceeding as if Eighth Amendment Excessive Fine prohibition applied to state and its subdivisions
without making assumption explicit).
199. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-804.oi(A) (2012) (requiring misdemeanant to "reimburse the
political subdivision that is responsible for the costs of the person's incarceration for the incarceration
costs"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-701(4) (2013) (providing when "any person is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, whether to a county jail or the department of corrections, the court shall order such person
to make such payments toward the cost of care as are appropriate under the circumstances"); IDAHO
CODE § 20-607(i) ("The county sheriff shall seek reimbursement [from inmates] for any expenses
incurred by the county in relation to the charge or charges for which a person was sentenced to a county
jail."); ME.REV.STAT. fit. 17-A, § 1341(1) (2012) ("[Tlhe sentencing court shall consider and may assess as
part of the sentence a reimbursement fee to help defray the expenses of the offender's room and board
[in county jail]."); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.o38(a) (2011) ("In addition to any fine, cost, or fee
authorized by law, a court that sentences a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor to serve a term of
confinement in county jail and orders execution of the sentence may require the defendant to reimburse
the county for the defendant's confinement at a rate of $25 a day.").
200. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (i98t). The room and board requirement is often
contained in state statutes as well. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 20-612, 20-607(I) (2013) (establishing
"duty of the board of county commissioners to furnish all persons committed to the county jail with
necessary food, clothing and bedding" and requiring sheriffs to seek reimbursement for these expenses
from inmates).
2Ol. See Tillman, 221 F.3d at 419 (holding no Eighth Amendment violation by county pay-to-stay
program where prisoner "cannot show that basic human needs were left unsatisfied. He was never
denied room, food, or other necessities, regardless of his failure to pay the fees") (citing Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 347); see also KRAutrH & STAYTON., supra note 2, at 15 ("Jails do not deny services to inmates
who cannot pay" non-program fees, which are defined as "those that are assessed in relation to
everyday facility operations and services.").
202. Montana offers an exception to this general rule; its pay-to-stay statute provides that
"[c]onfinement costs, other than actual medical costs, must be ordered by the court and must be paid
in advance of confinement." MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2245(I) (2013).
203. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 620 (1993) (referring to a fine as a "'traditional
criminal sanction"'); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03 (Official Draft 1962) (establishing a fine as a
potential sentence for a "person who has been convicted of an offense").
204. Any such scheme would need to ensure that no impermissible incentive is created for the
decisionmaker to assess the fine. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 5Ot U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991) ("There is
good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out
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Indeed, a handful of jurisdictions have such a setup for their pay-to-stay
programs. 5 However, the far more common approach is to establish the
statutory pay-to-stay obligation as distinct from a fine or a penalty, either
by explicitly distinguishing it or by simply using different terminology,
such as "reimbursement" or "repayment."2 °' It is tied instead to repaying
the specific amount the county spent on the custody of an individual
inmate, rather than being tied directly to the underlying criminal act
committed by the inmate as a fine or a penalty would be. It is therefore
generally not a fine.
2.
Restitution
These payments are also not typically restitution. In the context of
criminal cases, "[r]estitution refers to a payment by the offender to the
victim for financial losses."2" Statutes in every state provide for
restitution."' There is certainly a plausible argument to be made that
criminal restitution could provide a basis - or at least an analogy - for the

pay-to-stay obligation; just as the inmate who commits assault must pay
the medical costs incurred by his victim, so too must he pay some or all of
the cost to the county of incarcerating him due to his crime, which by
extension relieves the burden borne by its taxpayers. In this type of view,
although the pay-to-stay "compensation scheme is obviously not the
same as restitution, it. . . [is] a similar type of sentencing consequence.""
Indeed, a small number of state statutes explicitly include pay-to-stay
within the auspices of their criminal restitution schemes in some
fashion." ' It is far more common, however, to see this obligation defined

of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence. Imprisonment, corporal punishment, and
even capital punishment cost a State money; fines are a source of revenue.")
205. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-I29(a)(i)(A), (C) (2012) (providing that "the governing body
in which a district court is located may by ordinance levy and collect an additional fine not to exceed
twenty dollars from each defendant.., to be deposited into a fund to be used exclusively to help defray
the cost of incarcerating prisoners").
2o6. Some statutes are quite explicit that the pay-to-stay obligation is distinct from a fine. See, e.g.,
W. VA. CODE § 7-8-I4(a) (2013) ("[fln addition to any fine... a person so convicted and incarcerated
in a regional jail by virtue of said conviction may be assessed the costs of up to thirty days of his or her
incarceration."). Even absent such exclusionary language, references to reimbursement, repayment, or
the like imply a distinction between the pay-to-stay obligation and a fine. See supra note 199.
207. Ruback & Clark, supra note 35, at 756; see also Beckett & Harris, supra note 16, at 510.
208. Ruback & Clark, supra note 35, at 756.
209. Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 2000) (Rendell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see People v. Houston, 604 N.W.2d 7o6, 711 (Mich. Ct.
App., 1999) (labeling civil order for inmate to repay incarceration costs to county or state "a species of
restitution").
210. See, e.g., State v. Bogdan, No. 10-1156, 2011 WL 666o6o3, at *i (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011)
(describing how sheriff sought room and board cost "as part of a restitution plan" from inmate); UTAH
CODE § 76-3-20I(6)(a) (2013) ("In addition to any other sentence the court may impose ... the
defendant shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of medical care
provided to the defendant while in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing.").
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with the general language of reimbursement, costs, or repayment rather
than labeling the requirement restitution. 21 ' Thus by their own terms,
state laws generally seek to distinguish pay-to-stay from restitution. This
is not to say that the chosen label is dispositive of the substance of the
transaction, but to observe that state statutes seem to be attempting to
establish pay-to-stay using a mechanism other than restitution." '
More fundamentally, the typical pay-to-stay program does not fit with
the underlying principles of criminal or civil restitution. With respect to
criminal prosecution, it is a stretch to say that the county or the general
public is an additional victim of every crime that results in incarceration
to the extent they deserve restorative payment. 23 And it is also a stretch
to say that it is a loss for the county to be required to fulfill its legal
obligation to provide those individuals in its custody with basic room and
board, although of course there is an expenditure of funds in doing so.
Turning to civil restitution, the concepts at play are of course quite
complex and the subject of much debate.2 4 Broadly speaking, restitution
in this context concerns preventing unjust enrichment by prohibiting an
individual from benefitting from his own misconduct." ' Given the county's
constitutional responsibility for providing room and board to inmates,

211. See supra note 199. Other scholars have defined the categories of economic sanctions in
criminal cases to separate restitution from "costs and fees [which] refer to court-imposed orders to
reimburse the jurisdiction (local, county, state) for the administrative cost of operating the criminal
justice system." Ruback & Clark, supra note 35, at 755. I do not think pay-to-stay is a fee, and I see the
label "cost" as more descriptive than substantive, a starting point for analyzing the nature of the
transaction that occurs in pay-to-stay. But I agree with Ruback and Clark that restitution in the
criminal context is generally different from pay-to-stay and other charges levied against defendants for
the costs associated with their criminal prosecution and sentence.
212. See Emerson College v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d io98, iio4-o5 (Mass. 1984) ("'[T]he
intention of the Legislature, as it may be expressed in part through its characterization [of the charge] ...
deserves judicial respect.' Ultimately, however, the nature of a monetary exaction 'must be determined by
its operation rather than its specially descriptive phrase."') (citations omitted).
213. See Ruback & Clark, supra note 35, at 756 (explaining that "[r]estitution is aimed at doing justice
by having the offender compensate a victim for damages caused by the crime"). Of course, a defendant
that commits an offense against the county directly-such as vandalizing county property-may be said to
have victimized the county. Cf. KADISH ET AL., supra note I94 (quoting John L. Mackie, Retributivisn" A
Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHIY OF LAW 678 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., i99!)
("[S]urely the central notion [of retribution] is not that the criminal repays a debt, pays something back to
society, but that someone else pays the criminal back for what he has done.")); see also Timothy D.
Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public Services from Tortfeasors?: Tort
Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the Free Public Services Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REV. 727,
733 (2oo2) (describing body of case law in which government unsuccessfully brought tort suits against
criminal defendants for cost of "their capture and incarceration... [t]he principle established by these
cases is that the affront to governmental authority entailed by the commission of a crime does not itself
constitute a tort").
214. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Structure of Unjustness,92 B.U. L. REv. Io67, io67 (2012).
215. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF THE LAW: RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 1-4 (201 I).
216. The existence of a duty to perform a service on another's behalf does not in and of itself
render restitution unavailable to the provider; to the contrary, a "claim for emergency medical services
rendered in the absence of contract is one of restitution's paradigms." Id. § 20, cmt. a. The key
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as well as the dubious nature of the claim that inmates benefit in any real
way from incarceration," 7 general restitution principles do not seem to
offer a strong basis for most pay-to-stay programs.
3. Taxes
Pay-to-stay is also not usually understood as a tax. In general, taxes
are "an enforced contribution to provide for the support of
government..2.s Typically, such contributions are assessed on the basis of
an action that an individual has undertaken or failed to undertake, such
as living or working in a state, buying cigarettes, or not having health
insurance in certain circumstances." 9 As the proceeds of pay-to-stay
programs appear to be directed typically toward a county's general fund,"'
an inmate's financial obligation shares taxation's function of supporting
the government. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a $250 socalled "service fee" for prosecution and related costs imposed on all
defendants convicted of a crime in Hawaii's first circuit was a local taxand an impermissible one at that-rather than a legitimate fee. ' Although
the program in question was not of the pay-to-stay variety, it is a decent
analogue in one key respect: it assessed costs for the criminal justice
system against defendants based on their presence in the system. The
program did not assess costs based on the specifics of defendants'
individual circumstances, which pay-to-stay programs generally do by
seeking reimbursement for some or all of the costs of an inmate's actual
confinement.
At least one state appellate court has specifically rejected the notion
that a pay-to-stay program amounts to taxation, explaining that an
inmate "is charged under the reimbursement statute his share of his jail
stay. He is then taxed along with the rest of the citizens of the State to
difference between this paradigmatic scenario and pay-to-stay is that the former falls under "general
principles that justify compensation for nonbargained [sic.] benefits voluntarily conferred," whereas
the existence of benefits to the inmate is dubious in the latter scenario. Id.
217. See id. § 62 (setting forth defense to restitution that "some or all of the benefit conferred did
not unjustly enrich the recipient when the challenged transaction is viewed in the context of the
parties' further obligations to each other"); see also State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 744 n.8 (Haw.
1999) (responding to government's argument that criminal punishment benefits the criminal by
footnoting passage from George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four).
218. Nat'l Ass'n Indep Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651 (2o1)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
219. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62C, § 6(a) (2012) (establishing filing requirements for
Massachusetts income taxes); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6 4 C, § I (defining tobacco products for taxation
purposes); Sebelius, No. 11-393 slip op. at 35-37 (describing "[s]hared responsibility payment as a
tax' that will be due for those required to have health insurance who do not have it).
220. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
221. See Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 742; see also In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Metcalf, 963 P.2d 911,
921 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (responding to challenge by state prisoner to statutory scheme requiring
deductions from prison wages and all outside monies deposited into account by stating that
"deductions operate essentially like a tax on prisoners, not as a punishment").
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pay for any inmates that are unable to pay reimbursement for their
stays .....
In other words, the pay-to-stay obligation is predicated on what
the inmate has received from the government, whereas taxation is
grounded in what contribution the inmate owes to the government based
on some general heuristic.2 3 That pay-to-stay revenue winds up in the
general fund does not, in and of itself, establish the basis for levying the
obligation. The distinction between reimbursement and a general
support obligation thus argues for declining to view the typical pay-tostay reimbursement arrangement as a form of taxation. 4
4. Fees
Among the types of familiar financial transactions, pay-to-stay
programs seem most likely fall under the fees category. On a formal level,
judicial decisions approve of the fee language for pay-to-stay programs.2 5
Some state statutes also use the term,26 although the more common
222. State v. Bogdan, 81o N.W. 2d 25, *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (citing S.P. Conboy, Note, Prison
Reimbursement Statutes: The Trend Toward Requiring Inmates to Pay Their Own Way, 44 DRAKE L.
RE. 325, 327 (1996)); cf. Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 911 ( 9 th Cit. 2000) (holding that state
prison reimbursement scheme -in which a percentage of some deposits into inmate trust accounts was
deducted for inmate maintenance-was not a tax for purposes of the federal Tax Injunction Act); State
Reimbursement for Prisoners' Maintenance,supra note 52, at 1305 (describing requirement that state
prisoner pay reimbursement for his maintenance costs as "not a tax at all, but merely payment for a
special, if somewhat peculiar, service which the prisoner receives").
223. Whether a taxpayer receives any service from a local tax levy is irrelevant to whether the levy
comports with the uniformity principle, an important limit on local taxation. See Laurie Reynolds,
Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What You Pay For" Model of Local Governance, 56 FLA.
L. REV. 373,383-84 (2004).
224. This is not to say that the commonalities between pay-to-stay and taxes-namely, that they go
to raise general revenue-are entirely irrelevant. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 5, at 30 ("Concerns
arise ...when courts are used to collect fees that go to ...general revenue," including that "clerks ...
[turn] into general 'tax collectors"); see also McCormack, supra note 35, at 239 ("Misdemeanor
[economic] sanctions often instead [of just punishment] resemble an ad hoc occasion for excessive
county taxation.").
225. See, e.g., Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg'l Jail, 4o7 F.3d 243, 254 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 63 (1989)) (stating that "a strong argument can be made that the
charge at issue [county pay-to-stay program] is a 'reasonable user fee' and not a taking," but not
whether the court accepted this argument); Sickles v. Campbell Cnty., 439 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (E.D.
Ky. 2006) (referring to county pay-to-stay charges as fees and noting that courts have "uniformly
recognized that the imposition of such fees is valid"); cf.Waters v. Bass, 304 F. Supp. 2d 802, 8o9 (E.D.
Va. 2004) (citing Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F. 3 d, 410 420 (3d Cir. 20o0)) (finding
that room and board charge in city jail was a non-punitive fee that was not "'excessive' in any realistic
or constitutional sense"). But cf Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 745 (holding that so-called "service fee" for
prosecution and related costs levied against defendants was not a valid fee based on modified Emerson
College test).
226. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 19-193o(e) (2012) (permitting board of county commissioners to require
a jail inmate "to pay to the county a fee ...to help defray the costs of maintaining such inmate in the
county jail"); VA. CODE § 53.1-131.3 (2013) (permitting sheriff or jail superintendent to "charge [jail]
inmates a reasonable fee ...to defray the costs associated with the prisoners' keep"). Some statutes
speak both of reimbursement and of fees, characterizing the reimbursement as taking the form of a
fee. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 534.045(0) (West 2013) (permitting court to assess against
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approach is to use language of reimbursement or repayment.227 And on a
substantive level, categorizing the pay-to-stay obligation as a fee makes
sense. The inmate is required to pay for some or all of the costs of his
time in jail; that is, he is paying the county for something the county is
doing related to him. In general, fees have been described as a "pay for
play" set-up: to receive a service, good, license, permission, or similar
item from the government, the recipient must pay."' Fees are typically
classified as either user fees or regulatory fees; the former are "charges
levied by the government in exchange for citizen use of government
services or property," while the latter "are based more broadly on the
government's police powers and are imposed on a regulated
individual ... in order to offset the cost of the regulation. 2 9 Pay-to-stay
seems like it could fall into either category: the inmate is using the jail
facility, and the government is regulating him at no small cost itself.
Upon closer inspection, however, pay-to-stay charges are not actually
either type of fee but a distinct type of "transfer of funds."23
Valid user or regulatory fees require, inter alia, that the payor
somehow benefit from that for which he pays, be it from a service
directly to him or from a more general regulatory scheme. 3' Here again,
it is difficult to contend that an inmate-payor is benefitting from his time
in jail; that he receives secure accommodations and basic sustenance -as
opposed to being handcuffed by the sheriff in the middle of a county
park, for example, without access to food or drink-does not mean he is
benefitting so much as being kept from the harm that could befall him
when he is unable to provide for himself due to his custodial status. 3 '
Indeed, in response to an argument from a local government that
criminal defendants enjoy some degree of benefit from being punished

misdemeanants sentenced to county jail "a reimbursement fee to help defray the expenses of the
prisoner's room and board"). Such configuration seems to suggest that the legislature was attempting
to set up a distinct mechanism from a typical fee. For a typical fee, the government would not pay the
fee first itself then get reimbursed.
227. See supra note 199.
228. See Reynolds, supra note 223, at 376 n.14.
229. Id. at 407.
230. Tillman, 221 F.3d at 417 (reserving question of whether pay-to-stay obligation in county jail
was fee or fine).
231. See Reynolds, supra note 223, at 410. Voluntary payment-generally absent in pay-to-stay
schema-has traditionally been another requirement for a valid fee; however, I do not focus on this
factor because it has eroded in recent years. See, e.g., State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 741-42 (Haw.
1999) (discussing erosion of voluntariness requirement for valid fees). But see Mitchom, supra note 19,
at 200 ("[If pay-to-stay is to be characterized as a simple administrative fee ... it is radically different
than other such fees" because payment is not voluntary).
232. While I recognize that philosophical arguments could be made that the absence of harm is
itself a benefit, I seek to make a more commonsensical observation: being incarcerated is not generally
understood to be a positive experience for the inmate, even if it could be worsened. And even within
philosophical discourse, common sense does have a role to play. See SHELLY KAGAN, NoRMATIvE
ETmCS 25 (1998) (identifying "common moral outlook which we might call common sense morality").
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(the goal of the prosecution for which they were being charged the socalled "service fee" at issue in the case), the Supreme Court of Hawaii
simply dropped a footnote to a passage from the novel Nineteen EightyFour.33 While the Court's manner may have been somewhat snarky, the
underlying point is serious: the carceral experience cannot generally be
called positive -or even humane."
With respect to user fees, not paying the fee generally makes the
would-be user ineligible for the good or service in question. 3 For instance,
an individual wishing to visit a county zoo must pay for admission. 36 In
contrast, non-payment of the pay-to-stay obligation should never render
an inmate ineligible for jailhouse room and board.237 Thus, pay-to-stay

233. Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 744 n.8 (depicting dystopian future of totalitarian government). But cf.
Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing reimbursement scheme for state prison
inmates as "more akin to a regulatory fee than a tax" because it "is used to defray the cost of
incarcerating the inmates"). Versions of this debate have played out across the country in non-judicial
arenas. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 73, at Ci ("Some county officials view the inmate fees like any
other charge for service-people who rent county park shelters pay a fee, so why shouldn't they pay when
they are sleeping over at the jail? Others say that's a faulty analogy because people choose to rent a park
shelter while they typically don't ask to go to jail.").
234. See Jeannie Suk, Redistributing Rape, 48 AM. CiuM. L. REv. III, I11 (2011) ("Prison is hell.");
see also Alexandra Napatoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1313, 1322-23 (2012) (explaining how
"jails are functionally similar to prisons" in exposing inmates to threats of rape and disease). It should
be noted that an actual benefit is not always necessary to sustain a regulatory fee; instead, such a fee
"will be upheld if it is levied in 'reasonable relationship to the social or economic "burdens" that [the
fee-payer's] operations generated."' Reynolds, supra note 223, at 41 '. Certainly, the cost imposed by a
typical pay-to-stay program bears a "reasonable relationship" to maintaining an inmate, but whether it
is a burden for a county to maintain the inmate-given that the government has chosen to hold him in
custody and thus has a constitutional duty to give him room and board-is less clear. Even if
maintaining the inmate constitutes a burden, however, another general principle of valid fees (of both
types) would tend to keep pay-to-stay from being construed as a valid regulatory fee: "local
governments ... [must] carefully segregate fee revenues and spend the proceeds solely on the
endeavor assessed for the fee." Id. at 413. Revenue from typical pay-to-stay programs does not appear
to be segregated but goes to county general funds. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. And the
typical pay-to-stay program does not cover rehabilitation costs, which may be assessed separately. See
supra note 13.
235. Cf Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 741 (describing user fees as "based on the rights of the
[governmental] entity as a proprietor of the instrumentalities used"). Proprietors and providers do not
tend to give away goods or services for free, although some may in certain circumstances, such as
health care professionals required by law to provide care regardless of a recipient's ability to pay. See
Nat'l Ass'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 5 (S. Ct. June 28, 2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Unlike markets for most products... the inability to pay
for [health] care does not mean that an uninsured individual will receive no care."). With respect to
regulatory fees, payment is generally necessary to continue to engage lawfully in the activity being
regulated, but other conditions attach as well. See, e.g., United Bus. Comm'n v. City of San Diego, 154
Cal. Rptr. 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (citation omitted) ("In general ... where the fee is imposed
for the purpose of regulation, and the statute requires compliance with certain conditions in addition
to the payment of the prescribed sum, such sum is a license proper, imposed by virtue of the police
power; but where it is exacted solely for revenue purposes and its payment gives the right to carry on
the business without any further conditions, it is a tax.").
236. See Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 743-44.
237. See supra notes 184, 201.
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programs are in tension with the "pay for play" nature of fees in a
fundamental way: inmates actually never need to pay to in order to stay.
B.

GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED LOANS

Inmates have a constitutional right to receive room and board
regardless of whether they fulfill their pay-to-stay obligation, but those
inmates who pay all charges contemporaneously with their custody do
not pay directly for their maintenance. Rather, the government provides
the room and board-entering into all necessary arrangements,
contractual and otherwise, with the relevant providers. The inmates then
reimburse the government for its expenditures, which will be made
regardless of whether or not an inmate is paying for his stay. The
government is thus the initial payor, essentially advancing funds to inmates
to cover room and board.
In many relevant respects, this arrangement resembles yet another
familiar model of government-citizen financial transactions, albeit not
usually on the local level: student loans. 39 In the most general context, a
loan is understood as a "thing lent for the borrower's temporary use,"
which when applied to finances is typically "a sum of money lent at
interest,"2" although loans may be interest-free as well. 4' In the context
of educational debt, the student bears legal responsibility for all or part
(if she receives scholarships or a tuition discount or waiver) of the cost of
attending a given program. Typically, she cannot pay this cost up front,
so she applies for assistance, at least part of which is likely to come from
government loans. " If she is approved, an assessment process that
generally includes factors such as "financial need," 3 the government will
loan her funds to cover part or all of her tuition and related costs up to

238. See supra note 201.
239. There are multiple student loan programs available to eligible students through both the
federal and state governments. See DEANNE LOONIN, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CrR., STUDENT LOAN LAW
§§ 1.4.1, 1.4.2 ( 3 d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009). Their details are quite complex. For purposes of this current
analogy, this Article refers to the government student loan mechanism in the most general sense-the
government originating or facilitating the origination by private lenders of funds to students for
educational use-without analyzing details of any more specific model.
240. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY ioi9 (9th ed. 201).
241. See id. at 1020.
242. See, e.g., Meeting the Cost of Attendance, HARVARD L. SCH.. http://www.law.harvard.edu/
current/sfs/basics/cost/index.html (Oct. 12, 2013) (listing tuition for the 2012-2013 academic year at
Harvard Law School as $52,350 and encouraging students to apply for aid, which is guaranteed to all
students who demonstrate financial need according to a combination of federal and institutional
guidelines); Policy Overview, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/sfs/policy/
index.html (Sept. I i, 2013) (explaining that federal loans are available for students who do not qualify
for aid directly from Harvard Law School).
243. LoONIN, supra note 239, § 1.4.3. Notably, students seeking to borrow federal loans "do not
have to prove creditworthiness." Id. § 1.5.2.
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certain limits." The government transfers the money directly to the
school, meaning that the student may never have it in her possession. 45
After the student has completed her course of study, she must repay the
government a specified amount, along a set timeline, with interest
accruing.24 6 She may set up a direct debit arrangement from her bank
account.247 If she does not make his regular payments in full and on time,
she is subject to penalties, ranging from late fees to interception of her
income tax refund to payment of collection costs to being sued.24 8
However, her non-payment does not strip the school of any loan funds
that have already been transferred to it. Her payment status is likely to be
reported to credit bureaus,249 which in turn impacts her credit score and her
ability to borrow on good terms in the future. The effects of the loan thus
can significantly outlast even the already long loan term. Typically, student
debt may not be discharged using the bankruptcy process. 50
Pay-to-stay programs function in a surprisingly similar manner. The
inmate is made legally responsible for the costs of his room and board.25 '
The government pays them initially then requires the inmate to
reimburse it for all or part of its expenditure."' Direct account debit may
be used. 53 Repayment terms are based on various factors, including the
inmate's ability to pay. 54 Over the course of repayment or in the event of
nonpayment, the inmate may be required to pay interest, late fees,
collection costs, or be subject to penalties such as the garnishment of his
income tax refund. 55 Nonpayment does not mean that the relevant
providers will not get paid for the maintenance that the inmate received.
His payment status may be reported to credit bureaus, which carries
consequences for his borrowing potential, as well as for his employment
and other matters,, 6 The effects of the pay-to-stay obligation may be quite
enduring, and bankruptcy does not usually offer relief."5
244. See id. §§ 2.2, 2.6.

245. See id. § 2.6.
246. See id. §§ 2.7.2-3.
247. See, e.g., While You're In Repayment, FED. STUDENT AID, http://www.direct.ed.gov/
inrepayment.html (Sept. 17, 2013) (offering a financial incentive for direct loan borrowers to repay
with electronic account debit).
248. See LoONIN, supra note 239, §§ 4.4.1 (collection costs and late fees), 5.2.1 (tax refund
interceptions), 4.3.4.2 (collection lawsuit).
249. See generally id. § 4.3.4.2.
250. See Mona Lewandoski, Barred From Bankruptcy: Recently Incarcerated Debtors In and
Outside Bankruptcy, 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 195 (2010).
251. See supra Part I.B.

See supra Part
253. See supra Part
254. See supra Part
255. See supra Part
252.

II.A.i.
I.B.2.b.
I.B.2.d.
I.B.2.e.

256. See supra Part I.B.2.e.
257. See Lewandoski, supra note 250, at 205 (explaining that inmates' "bills for prison room and

board may come under § 523(a)(7)" of the Bankruptcy Code and be non-dischargeable as "penalties that
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Still, there are important differences between the student loan and
pay-to-stay models. Perhaps most crucial is that student loans are assumed
voluntarily, whereas the pay-to-stay obligation is imposed by the
government to recoup costs for which the government would otherwise
bear responsibility.55 For this reason, the pay-to-stay obligation should be
understood as a distinct type of loan: a government-imposed loan that
results in mandatory borrowing by the debtor. While other scholars, as
well as some advocates, have recognized that the pay-to-stay obligation
results in a general debtor-creditor relationship between the inmate and
the government 59 - and at least one has recognized that public defender
reimbursement amounts to a loan 6°-it does not appear that they have
articulated and explored a model of the debt specifically as a loan
imposed on the inmate.
Upon first glance, this Article's contribution, replacing the term
creditor with that of lender, might seem to be a matter of semantics. It is
common to think of the terms creditor and lender as synonymous;
indeed, in many-but not all-contexts, they are. A creditor is the person
to whom a debt is owed,"6' whereas a lender is a person or entity from
whom something is borrowed, often money. Borrowing is the receiving
of money "with the understanding or agreement that it must be repaid,"
usually with interest. While it seems fair to characterize all lenders as
creditors, not all creditors are lenders; 64 that is, not all creditors intend to

remedy financial loss... [even] if compensation is not their primary purpose") The specifics of the
statutory scheme imposing the pay-to-stay obligation may be dispositive of the issue of nondischargeability: "If a debt to the government is assessed in separate punitive and pecuniary components,
some states allow the pecuniary component to be discharged under Chapter 7." Id. at 205-06.
258. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 16, at 517-18 (stating that "legal debt [which may include
pay-to-stay] is an especially injurious type of financial obligation; unlike consumer debt, it is not offset
by the acquisition of goods or property and might trigger an arrest warrant, arrest, and/or
incarceration")
259. See, e.g., Lewandoski, supra note 250, at 247 ("The role of local.., governments as the
ultimate creator or assignee of a large amount of debt [which may include pay-to-stay charges]
burdening impoverished former criminals makes them unique as creditors."). See generally Beckett &
Harris, supra note i6;see also BANNON ET AL, supra note 5, at 27 (arguing that "states have not
considered whether turning defenders into debtors is consistent with the need to reduce recidivism,
reduce over-incarceration, and promote reentry"). At least one federal court of appeals has begun to
explore how an inmate may assume the role of a debtor and the state a creditor in disputes involving
inmate trust accounts. See Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 544 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding, for
the first time among federal circuit courts, that "[t]hrough its assessment" of inmate's trust account for
costs resulting from harm inmate caused to another inmate, "the Department of Corrections attained a
status akin to a Judgment Creditor").
260. See Anderson, supra note 8,at 371.
261. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 424 (9th ed. 2011).

Id. at 985.
263. Id. at 209. Interest is significant but not dispositive; interest free loans exist. See id.
264. See id. (providing a secondary definition of a creditor as "one who gives credit for money or
goods").
262.
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offer money to be borrowed.2 6 This distinction is subtle but may be
meaningful in certain contexts. For instance, creditors may be owed
debts by individuals or entities that are not grounded in the creditors'
having made money available to them. Debts may arise from failure-by
debtors-to fulfill a legal obligation unrelated to any type of loan
agreement, such as paying criminal restitution or fines.266 Even traditional
fee-for-service providers may become creditors when recipients of their
services fail to pay, but it does not follow that they affirmatively enter
into an agreement with these recipients to let them borrow money.2" In
these and other scenarios, a creditor-debtor relationship exists, but it is
not predicated on lending money. Identifying the pay-to-stay transaction
as a government-imposed loan-rather than categorizing it more
generally as a credit arrangement- thus provides a more specific model
of the financial mechanism undergirding pay-to-stay programs than has
been discussed to date. 68 Furthermore, this understanding reveals that
jail housing-in many jurisdictions-involves a government-created
marketplace grounded in loans imposed on inmates. The final Part of this
Article discusses the normative implications and desirability of such an
imposed loan market.
III. ASSESSING GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED LOANS
This Part offers an initial assessment of the desirability of employing
government-imposed loans in connection with core services that state or
local governments are legally obligated to extend-by constitutional,

265. Indeed, the concept of credit applies even when no shared currency exists with which a loan
could be made. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, ioo GEO. L. J. 1675, 169o n. 79 (2012)
(identifying barter arrangements between Europeans and Native Americans in United States in
eighteenth century).
266. See, e.g., Lewandoski, supra note 25o, at 197-98.
267. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 293 (999)
("Reluctant
creditors include completely involuntary creditors (for example, the victims of automobile accidents,
who never sought any relationship with the debtor), as well as creditors who are sometimes forced by
circumstance or government regulation to extend credit (doctors and utilities, for example, who try to
operate on a cash basis)."). Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook identify "government agencies, other
than taxing authorities or educational lending agencies" as reluctant creditors. Id. at 294. This label
seems generally accurate; however, I would contend that it is not a good fit for governments that
impose a pay-to-stay obligation, as these entities seem to seek a creditor-specifically, lender-role.
268. Cf Beckett & Harris, supra note 16, at 51o ("[T]he fees and fines imposed in a particular
[criminal] case generate a single LFO [legal financial obligation]; the debt that results from their
imposition is collected through identical methods. It therefore matters little to a legal debtor whether
his or her financial obligation stems from a fee or a fine; the effects are indistinguishable."). Although
the defendant-debtor might well experience any monetary obligation resulting from his criminal case
as indistinguishable for some of his purposes, this perception does not establish the nature of the
underlying obligation or its legal character.
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statutory, or other sources of law-through their police powers. '69 At its
most general, an imposed loan may be defined as the requirement that
citizens who receive government services reimburse the government for
the cost of services based on their ability to pay. As with a familiar
consumer loan-like the student loan-the repayment obligation takes
place along a set timeline according to certain terms, such as the accrual
of interest and late fees for missed payments.27 ° The government may
7
report non-payment to credit bureaus or take other collection actions.1'
Central to the model is that non-payment does not result in nonprovision of services. 7' This analysis centers on the use of imposed loans
in the jail housing market but also considers other arenas in which they
are or could be used.
This Part claims that the imposed loan could extend beyond the jailhousing context and has done so already in certain other areas where
individuals receive services as a result of personal misdeed or
misfortune. 73 It continues by arguing that the use and potential
expansion of the imposed loan raises concerns related to two main areas:
citizen privacy and effective governmental service provision, both with
respect to the service to which the loan is attached as well as others.
Assuming for the moment that the loan mechanism is ethically
acceptable 74 it is still less desirable if the money it raises comes with
269. It is difficult to provide a comprehensive definition of such services, but one set of recent
examples is those "vital functions of modem government-punishing street crime, running public
schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few... [provided under] this general
[police] power of governing, possessed by the States." Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2578 (2012).
270. See supra Part IIB.

271. See supra Part II.B.
272. See supra Part I.B.2.d. Without this constraint, this mechanism could be somewhat more
vulnerable to constitutional challenge on Equal Protection grounds or, in the specific context of payto-stay, Eighth Amendment violations. See supra notes 184, 194. In general, governmental programs
that treat people differently based on their financial means are subject only to rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 323 (i98o) (stating that state anti-abortion programs discriminating against indigent women are
subject only to rational basis). Thus there exists a wide range of services that government could
provide using imposed loans-even with no ability-to-pay requirement- without running afoul of the
Equal Protection guarantee. Conventional fees would likely pass muster as well. Cf Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) ("Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform
basis is more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent."). Nonetheless, the imposed loan
with an ability-to-pay requirement offers the government an advantage: it would be even more
difficult for an Equal Protection claim to gain any traction.
273. See infra Part III.A.
274. Future work will examine ethical arguments regarding the normative desirability of the
imposed loan model, with particular attention to considerations of consent (for example, whether
inmates are implicitly consenting to imposed loans when they commit crimes; whether citizens are
implicitly or explicitly consenting to their local or state government functioning as a voluntary
creditor; and the like). If incarceration benefits society collectively-through incapacitation, for
instance, or by fulfilling a moral requirement to mete out retribution-then perhaps the public should
be paying the core costs of this shared benefit rather than creating a "captive market" of individual
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significant consequences from an operational standpoint. Examination of
the imposed loan model-with a focus on the real-world experience of
pay-to-stay programs -suggests that such costs may be inherent in its
structure. On balance, then, it does not appear that the basic consumer
loan model translates smoothly into a loan imposed by the government
on involuntary, captive borrowers. 75
A.

BEYOND PAY-TO-STAY

Pay-to-stay programs are not the only existing manifestation of
government-imposed loans.276 Versions of this model exist in certain other
arenas, including juvenile justice, search and rescue, and emergency
responder services. 77
Juvenile Justice
Many states have statutes requiring parents to pay for some or all of
the costs related to delinquency proceedings brought against their
children; such cases are triggered by alleged acts that would be criminal if
the perpetrator were an adult.7 It is not uncommon for this obligation to
be structured as an imposed loan with some type of ability-to-pay analysis:
the government provides the service and then requires reimbursement-in
some amount, with certain terms -by the parents. 79 The parents' financial
obligation may outlast the duration of the child's time in the state system
i.

inmate-payors. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 8,
i0 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds., 20I2) (raising concerns about inequality and corruption in "a society
in which everything is up for sale," and lamenting how "we have drifted from having a market
economy to being a market society"). But see Weisberg, supra note 20, at 59 (stating that government
officials "have already, in some sense, acquiesced in cost-benefit justice, and that the question has
become simply how to work out a better business plan").
275. This is not to say that citizens' choices have no impact on whether they incur an imposed loan,
but that these loans are imposed regardless of whether or not citizens willingly and explicitly consent
to the particular debt. Put another way, citizen-borrowers are likely not to want the debt (volition),
not to know a given action will result in the imposition of a debt (cognition), and not to have readily
means of disposing of the debt (exist). See Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors'Duties to Creditors: Power
Imbalances and the FinanciallyDistressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1243 (2003). ("The
more volition, cognition, and exit parties have, the closer they are to being viewed as contractual
participants of equal dignity.").
276. This observation is particularly true with respect to criminal defendants. The imposition of
certain costs associated with prosecution and punishment other than incarceration-such as bills for
public defenders-may also follow more or less an imposed loan model wherein counsel is provided
with the government paying the up-front cost and the defendant providing reimbursement. See supra
notes 5-I5 and accompanying text.
277. This list and the examples that follow are meant to be illustrative, not comprehensive.
278. See Eve M. Brank et al., Parental Responsibility Statutes: An Organization and Policy
Implications, 7 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 40-55 tbl.3 (2005) (listing state statutes which place various
financial obligations on parents of delinquents, such as paying for court costs or for services provided
to child).
279. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a)(6-io) (2012); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169B:40(I)(c) (2010).
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or even the child's minority.2'8 Consequences for non-payment may be
severe. For instance, "at least one Michigan court has gone so far as to
jail a mother whose only crime was that she was too poor to pay for her
son's incarceration at a )uvenile hall," and then bill her for her own room
and board while in jail.2
Search and Rescue
Some state and local governments are legally permitted to bill
recipients of search and rescue services: 8 the service is supplied regardless
of ability to pay, then-in certain circumstances-the government may
seek reimbursement from the rescued party."3 The amount of
reimbursement may be subject to negotiation, and ability to pay is often a
factor. In New Hampshire (perhaps the national leader in seeking search
and rescue reimbursement),"' imposing this financial obligation is the
result of an individualized determination by a group of government
officials. 55 The service recipient's financial circumstances may play an
important role, even if the statute does not explicitly require an abilityto-pay assessment." For example, an Eagle Scout stranded with a
sprained ankle on a snow-covered mountain in New Hampshire was
praised for "his personal heroics" by state officials following his rescue27
The scout voluntarily sent $I000 to the state. Sometime later, New
Hampshire sent him a bill: more than $25,000 for the cost of rescuing
2.

280. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:40.

281. ACLU, supra note 1o, at 35 (reporting that the mother "was homeless and working parttime[,] ... [t]he judge found her in contempt for failing to pay and jailed her .... [Sihe was released
for one day to work. She then picked up her $178.53 paycheck from work, hopeful that she now could
pay the $104 [for her son's incarceration] to get out of jail. Upon her return to the jail that evening,
however, the sheriff forced her to sign over her check to the jail to cover $120 for her [own] 'room and
board"').
282. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Salvage Awards On The Somali Coast: Who Pays for Public
and Private Rescue Efforts in Piracy Crises?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1399, 1403 (2010) (describing "recent
spate of 'search and rescue' expense statutes passed by American states").
283. See id. at 1420-21.

284. See Norma Love, New HampshireBills Eagle Scout from Halifax $25,ooo for Rescue Effort,
PATRIOT LEDGER (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.patriotledger.com/answerbook/Halifax/x87659IO9O/

New-Hampshire-bills-Eagle-Scout-from-Halifax-25-ooo-for-rescue-effort (identifying New Hampshire
as only one of eight states authorized to bill for search and rescue that does so with any degree of
regularity); see also Jonathan R. Deblois, Note, RestitutionaryRecovery: The Appropriate Standardof
Care for Emergency Rescue Reimbursement by Hikers, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. III, 112-13 (2013)

(identifying New Hampshire as leader among states that bill for search and rescue).
285. See

Search and Rescue

FAQs, N.H.

FIsH

& GAME,

http://www.wildlife.state.nh.us/

LawEnforcement/sar funding__FAQs.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) ("All cases are unique and not
all will get billed."); see also Nina Keck, Schussing Down Slopes Can Snowball Into a Search-andRescue Bill, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 23, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/2o13/o1/23/
169522284/schussing-down-slopes-can-snowball-into-a-search-and-rescue-bill)
(stating that New
Hampshire has collected "only about two-thirds of the $83,ooo they've billed in the past five years").
286. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206:26-bb(I) (2010).

287. Love, supra note 284.
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28
him.
Eventually, he was found not liable for the cost, based in part on
his inability to pay.' 89

3. Emergency Response
In addition to search and rescue services, some local jurisdictions
are using a version of the imposed loan in connection with emergency
services more broadly: charging "fire and accident victims across the
country... for fire department services once funded solely through
taxpayer money.'"'" So-called "crash" or "accident" taxes are being
imposed on "a growing number" of people nationwide. 9' These so-called
taxes are sometimes a straightforward user fee, where service will be
denied for non-payment. 9' However, in other instances, the mechanism
at work is actually a type of imposed loan: services are provided up-front
with no payment required, followed by bills to recipients, although it
does not appear that an ability-to-pay assessment is a formal requirement
in the process.293 Such a requirement could help alleviate mounting
criticism of this practice, which at least several states now prohibit. 4
4. Imposed Loan Expansion
Currently, a version of the imposed loan model is employed in
certain situations in which an individual requires specific governmental
action on his behalf due to personal misdeed (criminal conduct, negligent
hiking, lax parenting) or misfortune (lightning strike of a home,
misconduct by a mentally ill child). In theory, then, as long as no legal
impediment exists with respect to billing recipients for a specific service,295

288. Id.
289. See Ted Alvarez, Eagle Scout Off the Hook, BACKPACKER BLOGS: THE DAILY DIRT,
http://www.backpacker.com/newhampshireboyscout/blogs/17 5 1 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
290. Sarah Netter, Fire Departments Charge for Service, Asking Accident Victims to Pay Up,
ABC.coM (Feb. 4, 20io) http://abcnews.go.com/Business/fire-department-bills-basic-services-horrifyresidents-insurance/story?id= 9736696#.UEUFCUJcTFI (last visited Oct. 35, 2013).
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Jason Hibbs, Firefighters Watch as Home Burns to The Ground, WPSD LOCAL 6
(Sept. 30, 2OO), http://www.wpsdlocal6.com/news/locallFirefighters-watch-as-home-burns-to-the
ground-1o4o52668.html ("Each year, Obion County [Tennessee] residents must pay $75 if they want
fire protection from the city of South Fulton. But the Cranicks did not pay.... Imagine your home
catches fire but the local fire department won't respond, then watches it burn. That's exactly what
happened to [the Cranicks].").
293. See, e.g., Netter, supra note 290 ("It came in the mail less than a month after Darline Fairchild
watched her family's home go up in flames-a bill for the nearly $28,ooo it cost the fire department to
extinguish the blaze.").
294. Id.; see Reynolds, supra note 223, at 388 ("In general... commonly accepted values about the
government's obligation to provide essential services and deeply held convictions about the public
benefit of those services will operate to restrain the zeal with which local government seeks to recoup
the costs of some services from the user.").
295. For instance, imposed loan schema might need to be exempted statutorily from the free
municipal public services doctrine. See Rapp, supra note 282, at 1420 ("The common law's 'free public
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imposed loans could be extended in conjunction with a number of other
services a state or local government provides to citizens that have
committed or been subject to some type of bad or unfortunate ac296
Especially if budgetary constraints continue, such an option is likely to
appeal to governments.29 7 Moreover, the imposed loan model would be
consistent with a current spirit of innovation among some local
governments with respect to charging recipients directly for the services
they receive. For example, several years ago the government of Colorado
Springs, Colorado, shut off access to many public services due to funding
constraints but allowed interested individuals to pay directly to restore a
particular amenity. During this time, "Colorado Springs became an
unusual place, a city where the people who could afford streetlights paid
for them, a la carte. Others lived in the dark. It was like the capital of
''
In some
some very snowy, unusually affluent third world country.29s
respects, using an imposed loan would have been better, as access would
not have been denied for those who could not pay for the service.
Imposed loans are likely to trigger other issues, however, which the next
Subpart explores.
B.

CONCERNS ABOUT IMPOSED LOANS

The potential for additional revenue is arguably the strongest
argument in favor of the imposed loan mechanism. Even if such a
scheme makes money, which has not been the universal experience of
counties using pay-to-stay programs, 2 there are countervailing concerns
about the impact of imposed loans on citizen privacy, as well as the
dynamic effects of loan imposition on governmental service provision.
Although not all instances of imposed loan use will encounter all or any
of the potential difficulties discussed below, the very structure of the loan
invites them.3"

services doctrine' ordinarily bars governmental actors from seeking to recover rescue costs from those
in danger, but various statutes have carved out important exceptions.").
296. For instance, imagine "pay-to-plow," wherein unfortunate residents of snow-covered
neighborhoods were required to assume an imposed loan for their share of gaining access to public
streets.
297. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.

298. See This American Life: What Kind of Country, at Act Three, Do You Want a Wake Up Call?
(Mar. 2, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/459/
transcript).
299. See, e.g., News Section, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 14, 2010 (describing how Butler County,
Ohio ended its pay-to-stay program because the "state auditor insisted ... because it [the program]
wasn't collecting any money" but "Macomb County, Mich., claims to be the granddaddy of all pay-tostay programs, raking in more than $I million a year").
300. More familiar financial mechanisms are by no means devoid of structural issues; however, the
goal of this analysis is to focus on such issues in the imposed loan model.
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Privacy

In order to tailor the imposed loan's terms to an individual's
financial circumstances the government will need to obtain a significant
amount of information about her income, assets, expenses, and related
areas.3"' For example, the jail in Macomb County, Michigan requires
inmates to complete a "financial history" form documenting all sources
of income, including loans and debts, and the "type and value of personal
3 2 New Hampshire courts may require individuals whose
property.""
ability to pay an obligation-such as parental reimbursement- is at issue
to complete a more extensive affidavit, which includes questions about
expenses for alcohol and tobacco, pet food and care, and therapy and
counseling.3" Of course, both of these groups-inmates and parents
made parties to a delinquency case -are legally obligated to submit to all
manner of government scrutiny, which makes the submission of financial
details more of an insult upon a larger injury. 4 However, for those
mandatory borrowers not already subject to governmental monitoring,
sharing such details is likely to be regarded as an injury in itself. That
getting hurt on a hike or living in a home hit by lightning could trigger
government review of personal financial information is a rather surprising
consequence. Even if such review is not statutorily required for the
reimbursement obligation to attach, it is likely to occur, at least for those
individuals that cannot afford to pay and need to demonstrate their
situation to the government.0 5
Depending on the duration of the loan obligation-usually set by
statute -mandatory borrowers could be required to share this information
with government officials, agencies, or courts well past the duration of the
service itself. To return to the previous examples, Macomb County
presents itself as taking full advantage of all collection avenues available
once an inmate has been released and notes that it can seek collection on
judgments for up to twenty years after issue.3 6 And New Hampshire
requires parents to submit annual financial information to the relevant
court for up to four years after services to the child have ended so that

301. Cf. Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for
Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2046 (2006) (explaining that "traditional

Irecoupment' statutes [for costs of counsel appointed to indigent defendants] require a great deal of
judicial effort to sort the truly indigent from those with more resources").
302. See OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MACOMB CNTY., MICH., supra note i4O, at 12.
303. See

State

of N.H.

JUDICIAL BRANCH,

FINANCIAL

AFFIDAvrr

FORM

3, available at

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/forms/nhjb-2o65-fs.pdf.
304. See Brank et al., supra note 278, at i I; see also Suk, supra note 234, at I I I.

305. See supra Part III.A.3. Cf.Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Punishment
Regime, io CRIMINOLOGY PUB. POL'Y 555, 564 (2011) (concluding that "nothing is 'simple' in assessing

an individual's 'ability to pay').
3o6. See supra note 16o and accompanying text.
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the court can determine an appropriate reimbursement amount." The
imposed loan structure thus contemplates an ongoing, fairly long-term
relationship between the government (or its agent) and the service
recipient that may require the continued sharing of personal informationunless, of course, the recipient has the means to retire the debt immediately.
Governmental Service Provision
An individual's financial circumstances are likely to change over
time. The imposed loan model not only captures information about these
changes but potentially incentivizes such changes as well-and not
necessarily positive ones, either for the individual or for the prospects of
governmental service provision more broadly. Once subject to an
imposed loan regime, borrowers who never sought the obligation may
seek opportunities to avoid repayment. That consumer borrowers do this
in other contexts-even when they have voluntarily entered into a
loan°S-is all the more reason to suspect that they might do so when they
never explicitly agreed to the loan in the first place. Indeed, in
jurisdictions such as Macomb County that are vigilant about pursuing payto-stay debts after an inmate's release, the government may create an
incentive for former inmates not to work in order to keep their incomes
below the threshold for repayment.3" The difficulty of finding postincarceration employment may be exacerbated by the presence of debt
associated with the criminal case."' It seems misguided for the government
to create an additional incentive -no matter how slight - to eschew gainful
employment perhaps in favor of illegal means of making money." '
The difficulty of calibrating the proper dollar amount to achieve
maximum revenue from repayment, while not creating additional costs
for the government, is not limited to the pay-to-stay context. In general,
the imposed loan model puts the government in a tight spot; in order to
raise revenue from the model, it must charge a reasonably high rateone at least sufficient to offset its collection costs. As the rate is linked to
2.

307. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § I69-B:4o(I)(c) (2010).

308. See, e.g., Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure:Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the
Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 455, 460 n.24 (2012) ("Many [mortgage]
borrowers are choosing to 'strategically default' when the property values have plummeted to levels
far less than unpaid mortgage balances.").
309. Sociological research has found this to be the case for the general category of debt associated
with criminal cases. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 6, at 518 (explaining that "because the wages of

the convicted (and their spouses) are subject to garnishment, legal debt creates a disincentive to find
work."); see also id. (finding that "unpaid legal debt-and the threat of criminal justice sanctions it
engenders-encourage some to 'go on the run').
310. See supra Part I.B.2. Former inmates are also likely to have difficulty accessing credit from the
private market; see also Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Note, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting
Lending DiscriminationAgainst Ex-Offenders, 8o N.Y.U. L. REV. 1237, I243-44 (2005).
311 . See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 54, at 1785.
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borrowers' ability to pay, then borrowers may be incentivized to work
less or not to work at all to avoid liability. 32" That this quandary is quite
familiar to debates about the proper income tax rate does not lessen its
applicability here. To the contrary, it augments the concern. Given that
taxation is unlikely to disappear as a funding mechanism -after all, some
source of revenue is needed for the government to front the initial costs
of core services to mandatory borrowers-it seems undesirable to have
another mechanism in play subject to this same difficulty.
The consequences of setting loan amounts too high could result in
increased costs to the government in various forms. Especially if
mandatory borrowers have limited financial resources -as tends to be true
for inmates3 ' 4-fulfilling their obligation might come at a cost to
themselves and their families. This could require the government -and by
extension the tax-paying public-to pick up yet another tab: costs of
welfare or other programming for those facing difficult or emergency
circumstances occasioned by paying back their imposed loans rather than
fulfilling other financial commitments such as rent or grocery bills.3 5
Intra-family strain could lead to still more societal costs, such as those
associated with an increased incidence of spousal abuse, which may occur
during periods of financial stress.36 This avenue, and similar ones, could
well result in spending money on other governmental services that would
not have been necessary but for the initial loan imposition.
The government's collection efforts may affect this interplay between
areas of service as well. Effective collection is central to the successful use
of the imposed loan model, but it may also be quite costly. 37 Collection

312. See supra note 3o9 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121
YALE L. J. 888, 912 (2012) (explaining one "theory... that lower [tax] rates support economic activity
and thereby boost revenues").
314. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Fees for Jail Service, AKRON BEACON J., JAN. 4, 2011, at A6 ("Neil Hassinger, the
Medina County [Ohio] sheriff, dropped a per-day charge... [saying] that the charge merely shifted
some families onto welfare."); see also Beckett & Harris, supra note 16, at 517 ("[I]f debtors make
payments, legal debt [which may include pay-to-stay] substantially reduces household income and
compels people living on tight budgets to choose between food, medicine, rent, and child support.
Even 'small' payments of, for example, $5o a month can consume a significant share of defendants'
monthly income."). State and local programs-that do not rely on federal dollars-might be
particularly vulnerable for picking up this tab for former inmates, given that non-payment of a pay-tostay obligation that was made a condition of parole or probation might result in disqualification of
federal benefits. See supra note 173.
316. See, e.g., Dana Bartholomew, Increase in Domestic Abuse Tied to Recession, L.A. DAILY
NEWS (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.dailynews.com/news/ciI3447396.
317. See, e.g., Julia Silverman, Inmates Charged Again-For Stay, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, May 23,
2004, at A24 ("'If you go after people who owe you money on room and board or whatever, you will
end up paying more money for the bill collector than you can ever collect from these people,' said Ken
Kerle, editor of American Jails magazine."); see also Cammett, supra note 35, at 384 ("A true costbenefit analysis of user fees [criminal justice cost recoupment] would reveal that costs imposed on
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methods that seem particularly well-suited to captive markets may even
be defeated. For example, inmates may ask relatives not to send money
to their commissary accounts so as to protect it from direct debit
programs for pay-to-stay charges.' Proceeds from commissary purchases
may go to fund programs for inmates," 9 whereas pay-to-stay proceeds
appear to go mostly to county general funds.32 Therefore, inmates'
intentional underfunding of their accounts may result in fewer resources
being available for intra-jail needs.
In the pay-to-stay context, a number of jurisdictions have sought to
enhance collection results by contracting the task to private collection
agencies.32 ' On one level, this decision is quite logical: governments
frequently work with private entities in the corrections realm,322 and
collection agencies have an expertise that could offer a more efficient
collection process and profitable outcome.323 But it is by no means clear
that such partnerships truly bring about an overall net gain to the
government's bottom line. Collaboration with private providers may be
sheriffs' offices, local jails and prisons, prosecutors and defense attorneys, and the courts themselves
surpass what the states take in as revenue.").
318. See Butterfield, supra note 34 (quoting a Kentucky jail official: "[li'ts my experience that very
few jails that charge a per diem make any money'... inmates.., quickly learn not to put money into
their jail commissary accounts because the jail would debit the accounts to pay the fees").
319. See, e.g., Marilyn Miller, Deputies Stand Behind Proposalfor Jail Fees, AKRON BEACON J.,
Sept. 3, 2001, at Di ("Sheriff's officials say the money [from commissary purchases] goes into a special
fund to purchase items for inmates, such as new mattresses, and recreational or educational
equipment.").
320. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
321. See supra Part I.B.2.b. The choice of collection personnel and methods is key to the success of
a pay-to-stay or any imposed loan program. If revenue does not exceed costs, then the program is
unlikely to endure. See, e.g., Pay-to-Stay Mantra Nixed for Jails, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 14, 2010,
("'A complete failure is the best way to describe it [Clermont County, Ohio's pay-to-stay program],'
[Sheriff] Rodenberg said. 'When it came time to collect the pay-for-stay, it ended up costing almost as
much if not more to run the program."'). Private agencies are also being used to collect imposed loans
in the form of required reimbursement for fire department services or police response to car accidents.
See Netter, supra note 290 ("Most municipalities and fire districts across the country that have turned
to these types of service charges contract with billing companies who then take a cut of the
collections.").
322. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L. J. 437, 439 (2005)
(describing industry of private "entrepreneurs offering a range of services designed to appeal to the
overtaxed prison administrator, including everything from the siting and building of new prisons to the
day-to-day management of whole inmate populations"); see also PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES
MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION, at x (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007) ("The private
interests that attach to prisons generally take the following forms... [including] corporate interests
that vie to sell their wares or services to prisons.").
323. The term "debt collector" is susceptible to different definitions depending on the context. See
ROBERT J. HOBBS, NATI'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION § 1.16 (6th ed. 2008 & Supp.
2oio). It is used here to refer to for-profit businesses that collect debts owed to a creditor distinct from
the business itself. See id. § 1.5.2 ("A collection agency is most likely to be hired by the creditor if the
debt is not secured by collateral, is small.., or if the consumer appears to be judgment proof. The
most common type of collection agencies engage in the full range of collection activities permitted by
law and charge a contingent fee, i.e., retaining a portion of the money collected.").
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expensive and could well result in the government collecting a relatively
small amount of the actual debt owed to it."L4 To be sure, private
collection agencies are capable of generating some amount of revenue
for the government.3 25 But even in such instances, it is not clear that this
amount would represent a net gain financially to the government or the
general tax base, given the potential for borrower repayment to result in
reliance on other forms of governmental assistance, at least for
inmates.36 Thus even when collection techniques are successful, it may be
that the government has succeeded in making borrowers do business
with multiple government agencies or select private companies without
any overall financial gain for the government or taxpaying public.
CONCLUSION

Just as consumer loan products have become more complex and
varied in recent years,2 7 the likely trend for government-imposed loans
may well follow a similar path as the search for new revenue streams
continues. Not only could the imposed loan mechanism be used in
conjunction with other existing governmental services,"8 the mechanism
itself could morph to reach new payors and new lenders. For example,
new payors could be identified by directly billing inmates' families for
the inmates' room and board instead of relying on families to provide the
funds to repay the bills given to the inmates, which is already fairly
common.3"9 There is also a rational- although unsympathetic- argument
to be made for billing victims of crime (or victims' estates or families) for
the costs associated with the prosecution and punishment of the crime's
perpetrator: arguably, victims gain a distinct benefit from seeing the
perpetrator brought to justice. Indeed, in some states, victims already are
able to access or influence the use of a private prosecutor for a criminal
case.30 Of course, victims often are blameless and likely already incur
many costs as a result of the crime, justifications for not adding an
324. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. In some circumstances, it may be more
accurate to say that the government is using pay-to-stay to transfer inmates' money to the private
sector or to involve inmates in potentially long-term relationships with private companies rather than
characterizing pay-to-stay as a means of raising revenue for the government treasury.
325. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 314-316 and accompanying text.
327. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making CreditSafer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. I (20o8).
328. See supra Part III.A.4.
329. See, e.g., Butterfield, supra note 34 ("The wife of one [Macomb County] inmate, a Chrysler
truck factory worker who is serving half a year for drunk driving, dropped off a check for $7,212 this
week to cover part of his bill.").
330. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
659, 666 (2010). Cf Laurie L. Levenson & Mary Gordon, Commentary, The Dirty Little Secrets about
Pay-to-Stay, lo6 MIcH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 69-70 (2oo7) ("Would we countenance quasiprivate judges in the criminal justice system, the functional equivalent of what already largely exists on
the civil side in the form of arbitration?").

110

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:57

additional financial burden. However, victims of a lightning strike that
burned down their home are also innocent and have also incurred costs
separate from governmental outlay-yet some jurisdictions could and
" ' Thus, if the imposed
would bill them for emergency response services.33
loan model is accepted, placing loans on inmates' families or even victims
of inmates' crimes should not be deemed outside the realm of possibility.33 '
New lenders for imposed loan schema also might not be too difficult
to locate in the private sector. In the realm of corrections, public-private
partnerships are common fixtures.333 These arrangements include private
companies that make a profit by collecting monies that former inmates
are required to pay directly to them for probation services.334 And private
debt-collection companies are already being used to collect pay-to-stay
debts from inmates.335 It would be a small step for the government to
require inmates to borrow money from a designated private lender to
cover their room and board costs instead of borrowing from the
government through existing pay-to-stay programs. 336 Private lenders
might not be interested in lending to a population with dubious
repayment prospects;337 however, many private companies today are
finding innovative and lucrative ways to lend to low-income borrowers
with bad credit, 33' as well as to supply versions of core public goods, such
as private policing.339 It is conceivable that there would be bidders for

331. See supra Part III.A.3.
332. But see City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976)
("No one expects the rendering of a bill (other than a tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief.").
333. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. New private players in this realm continue to
emerge. See, e.g., David W. Chen, Goldman to Invest in City Jail Program,Profiting if Recidivism Falls
Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at A14 (identifying Goldman Sachs's investment in New York City
jail as first American "test [of] 'social impact bonds,' also called pay-for-success bonds, which are an
effort to find new ways to finance initiatives that might save governments money over the long term")
Cf. Whitman, supra note 66, at 1214 ("The reign of market solutions in American policymaking dates
to the same period as the incarceration boom: both are developments whose beginnings we can trace
to the mid-197os; and both accelerated in the 198os and after.").
334. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, PoorLand in Jailas CompaniesAdd Huge Fees for Probation,N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2012, at Al (describing lawsuits against private probation companies).
335. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
336. In this scenario, it is unclear what the government would do with inmates who could afford to
pay their room and board costs in full and up-front. Potentially, they could be allowed to do so, but
they could also be required to incur the loan on non-need-based grounds, such as education about
financial responsibility.
337. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How
States Protect Consumersfrom Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 31, 31 (2011) ("In twenty-nine states, there are more payday lender stores than McDonald's
restaurants."). That subprime small-dollar credit products abound does not necessarily mean they
constitute desirable loan products. See id. at 31-32.
339. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rav. 1165, 1168 (i999) ("The
private security industry already employs significantly more guards, patrol personnel, and detectives
than the federal, state, and local governments combined, and the disparity is growing.").
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such a contract, especially if the government were to guarantee some
minimum amount of repayment. An arrangement wherein inmates are
forced to become liable to a private company for costs associated with
their criminal prosecution and punishment certainly has historical
precedent, although this previous incarnation- convict leasing-has been
rightly condemned as "neo-slavery. '34
When it comes to certain core public services-such as criminal
justice and public safety-all citizens are, in some sense, inherently part
of a captive market; such services are essential, and the government
enjoys considerable latitude in setting the terms of their provision and
payment. It may be tempting to write off the imposed loan mechanism as
affecting only certain subsets of the population, such as criminal
defendants. But the device sweeps more broadly and could go further
still. It is worthy of recognition alongside other, more familiar citizenstate financial transactions, as well as careful scrutiny. Conditions remain
propitious for its continued use and potential expansion.

o
34 . DOUGLAS

A.

BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY

ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK

118 (2oo8). Cf.Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 50, at
75 ("Writs of assistance [in colonial America] authorized customs officers to seize suspected
contraband and to retain a share of the proceeds, often a third, for themselves and their
informants ....[These writs] were among the key grievances that triggered the American
revolution."). There is also historical precedent for Western governments delegating a significant role
to private companies in core citizen-state financial transactions outside the criminal justice system. See,
e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Asbestos and the Limits of Litigation, 44 S.TEx. L. REV. 1013, 1032 (2003)
("In pre-Revolutionary France, for example, the monarchy did not raise its own taxes. Rather it
'leased' the right to collect taxes to financial firms, who paid the government a sum up front and kept
whatever taxes they raised."). To put it mildly, these "tax-farming" programs were not well received
by the public. Id.
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